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 Topic overview 
 
 In the series of brutal conflicts that swept through the Balkans in the 1990s, the 
Kosovo War was the last episode in the drama of violent dissolution of the socialist 
Yugoslavia. It was a major international crisis of the time, producing substantial 
consequences both in the region as well as on the stage of world politics. 
 One year after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in 1995, ending the wars in 
Bosnia and Croatia, Albanians in Serbia’s southern province Kosovo started a rebellion 
against the central state authority in Belgrade. It was a peak of decades long political and 
ethnic quarrels between Serbs and Albanians in the province, which escalated into a crisis 
after the death of Yugoslavia’s absolute ruler Josip Broz Tito in 1980 and after Slobodan 
Milošević, a then rising star of Serbia’s Communist party, in 1987 limited and downplayed 
the broad Kosovo autonomy. An upheaval that started as occasional hit-and-run attacks on 
the Serbian security forces carried out by armed Albanian groups in the late 1996 and early 
1997, turned out into an all-out war in 1998 between the Serbian military and police, on 
one side, and the Kosovo Liberation Army, Kosovo Albanian’s guerilla forces, on the 
other. A large-scale destruction, killings and expulsions committed by both sides in the 
conflict, but mainly prescribed to the Serbian forces, prompted an international military 
intervention in the spring of 1999. After the United States failed to broker a peace deal 
between Serbia and Kosovo Albanians, NATO staged the 78-day long, an UN Security 
Council-unauthorized campaign of aerial bombing of Serbia. The goal was to force the 
Serbian military and police out of Kosovo and to halt the mass violations of human rights. 
After the Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo in June 1999, the province was placed 
under the UN administration with KFOR, the NATO forces, being in charged for the 
security. 
 In the years to follow, Kosovo was governed by the international community, which 
was also developing local institutional capacities, preparing the province for the period 
after the final agreement on the status. Following the widespread anti-Serbian riots in 
March 2004, the process of final status decision was speed up. In a one year-long 
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negotiations between Belgrade and Kosovo Albanians a solution had not been reached and 
with the support of major Western powers Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 
February 2008. So far, 75 out of 192 UN-member states recognized Kosovo. New round of 
talks between Belgrade and Priština sponsored by the EU began this spring, in order to 
breach the current stalemate in the two’s relations.   
 
Thesis Objectives 
 
 The major goal of the proposed topic is to examine key developments in the area of 
human rights in Kosovo, after the military intervention of NATO in 1999. The research 
will focus on non-Albanian ethnicities (Serbs and Romas, mainly) as now minority 
communities inside overwhelmingly Albanian-populated and controlled Kosovo. The thesis 
will attempt to answer questions: 
- What is the quality of security for minority communities in Kosovo? 
- Do they enjoy unrestricted freedom of movement on the whole territory 
of Kosovo and to what extent? 
- What is the current situation with displaced members of minority 
communities and what are the major trends in the process of return? 
- Are property rights of members of minority communities respected 
enough? 
- What are the crucial elements of minority communities’ cultural rights 
in Kosovo and how are they implemented in practice? 
- What is the general economic and social status of minority communities 
and what are its major determinants?   
 Simultaneously, the thesis will look into the role of the international community in 
the post-war Kosovo and its institutions and organizations present on the ground (UNMIK, 
OSCE, KFOR, EULEX, etc.) and try to identify and critically asses their influence on the 
developments of the issues. It will attempt to point out both potential successes and 
failures, drawing out causes and reasons for them. 
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 Acknowledging the fact that the theoretical body of human rights is large and fluid, 
this thesis will focus on those aspects of human rights framed by the theoretical framework, 
which is based on three major groups of sources: 
- Globally accepted charters, declarations and convents on human rights, 
adopted mainly by the UN bodies; 
- Documents on human rights by European institutions, such as the 
Council of Europe and OSCE, and; 
- Documents and strategies formulated by institutions in Kosovo, both 
international and domestic, in those aspects where they are referring to 
human rights. 
Therefore, the theoretical framework will be a synthesis of stipulations on human 
rights from sources mentioned above and shaped to address particular human rights issues 
arousing from specifics of the Kosovo case.  
In the sense of time, the topic spans from June of 1999, when Serbian forces left 
Kosovo and the province’s provisional authority and the UN administration were set in 
charge, to the present days. 
 
Methodology 
 
 This master thesis is a case study by its nature. Conclusions and findings will be 
based on a wide array of sources ranging from books, scholarly essays/papers, and official 
documents to journalistic articles/reports, interviews, surveys and statistics. Audiovisual 
materials such as politicians’ statements and documentary movies will also be used. 
Naturally, not all the sources will have the same significance for the production of the 
thesis. Criteria on which selection will be made are relevance to the topic, up-to-date 
character, amount of empirical data, and credibility of the source. An applied approach in 
the thesis will be combined theoretical and empirical-analytical. Initially, a theoretical 
framework structure will be established on the ground of applicable theories, which will be 
subsequently filled and shaped by empirical data and concrete findings suitable for the 
particular case. To that respect, the thesis should be more of an author-oriented than a 
theory-oriented character.  
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Subject Significance 
 
 When the Kosovo crisis was peaking in 1998 and 1999, it was a subject of great 
political, media and academic attention. Hundreds of books, papers and articles on human 
rights violations and NATO intervention in Kosovo were written. Somehow, when 
international peace forces entered the province and the UN took over the administration, 
the interest for Kosovo suddenly plunged. Human rights in Kosovo since then are only in 
focus of human rights watchdogs, such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, 
and local media outfits. 
The author hopes that this thesis will show that human rights violations are still 
present in Kosovo and that the issue was not resolved with the NATO military intervention 
and subsequent establishment of the international administration. In that respect, this thesis 
is an attempt to narrow down the information gap about Kosovo that has been widening 
throughout the past decade. 
 
Provisional Structure 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Methodology 
1.2.  Overview of literature 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Definition and content of human rights 
2.2. Definition and content of minority rights 
2.3. Human rights and minority rights in documents related to Kosovo 
2.4. Definition of “minority communities” 
2.5. Approaches in defining Kosovo’s status and institutions 
2.6. Structure of International Administration and Provisional Authorities 
3. Brief history of the Kosovo crisis 
4. Security and freedom of movement 
5. Displaced, return and property rights 
6. Cultural rights 
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7. Social and economic status of minority communities 
8. Conclusion 
9. Appendices 
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Abstract 
 
The given thesis examines the issues of human rights of minority communities in Kosovo 
under the UN-led international administration. The human rights of minority communities, 
Serbs and Roma foremost, are assessed through four wide areas of issues distinctive for 
Kosovo: security and freedom of movement; displaced, return and property rights; cultural 
rights; and economic and social rights. The thesis presents and highlights the most pressing 
issues for minority communities in these four areas, aiming to construct a comprehensive 
analysis of their status in Kosovo for the past 12 years. 
 
The thesis also scrutinizes policies, strategies and actions of the international 
administration and, subsequently, the provisional authorities in respect to minority human 
rights. Special emphasis is placed on the discrepancies between the proclaimed and the 
achieved, as the best measure of the international community’s level of success in Kosovo. 
 
The thesis concludes that Kosovo is the part of Europe where minority human rights are 
least respected and where the oppression of members of minority communities by majority 
Albanian population is widespread and systematic. Furthermore, the international 
administration and the provisional authorities were both unable and unwilling to prevent 
and punish major violations of minority human rights and that only modest success has 
been achieved, visible only in the past few years. 
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Anotace 
 
Předkládaná diplomová práce zkoumá problematiku lidských práv z pohledu minoritních 
komunit v Kosovu během mezinárodní administrativy vedené OSN. Lidská práva 
minoritních komunit, Srbů a především Romů, jsou zhodnocena prostřednictvím čtyř 
rozsáhlých oblastí problémů: bezpečnost a svoboda pohybu; vlastnická práva ; kulturní 
práva; a ekonomická a sociální práva. Práce uvádí a zdůrazňuje nejtíživější problémy 
minoritních komunit v těchto čtyřech oblastech, přičemž aspiruje na komplexní analýzu 
jejich statutu v Kosovu za posledních 12 let. 
 
Diplomová práce také zkoumá politiky, strategie a akce učiněné mezinárodní 
administrativou, přičemž nejsou následně opomenuty ani prozatímní autority ve vztahu 
k lidských právům minorit. Zvláštní důraz je kladen na neshodu mezi proklamovanými a 
dosaženými cíly, což nám slouží jako nejlepší nástroj pro měření stupně úspěchu 
mezinárodní komunity v Kosovu. 
 
Diplomová práce tak dochází k závěru, že Kosovo je součástí Evropy, kde minoritní lidská 
práva jsou málo respektována a kde utlačování členů minoritních komunit většinovou 
albánskou populací je velmi rozšířené a systematické. Kromě toho jsou mezinárodní 
administrativa a prozatímní autority neschopné a neochotné předcházet a trestat závažné 
porušování lidských práv minorit. V této problematice byl zatím dosažen jen malý úspěch, 
viditelný pouze v několika posledních letech. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The collapse of Communism and fall of the Iron Curtain at the end of the 1980s 
brought almost half a century-long awaited freedom for many nations across the until-then 
divided Europe. Democracy was introduced in the countries of Eastern Europe, followed 
by strong optimism of an emerging free and unified continent. However, these changes also 
prompted a number of armed conflicts in the region, as in some cases the drives by various 
ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups to reinvent their identities and redefine borders of 
their territories irreconcilably collided. 
 This scenario occurred in Yugoslavia, a once prosperous and relatively free 
multiethnic socialist country in southeastern Europe, which disappeared in a serious of 
brutal wars throughout the 1990s. The conflicts attracted huge international attention, as the 
continent was witnessing horrors unseen on its soil since World War 2. Mass destruction, 
displacements, refugees, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, mass rapes, war crimes, 
monstrous atrocities against civilians; they all became synonyms for what peoples of the 
former Yugoslavia were claiming to be a justified struggle for self-determination and 
independence. The widespread and large-scale violations of human rights impelled the 
international community, the US and the EU foremost, to actively engage in the wars on 
the grounds of protection of human rights. 
 Echoing the international intervention in the midst and aftermath of the Bosnia War, 
this argument was also used in the last episode of the Yugoslavia drama – the war in 
Kosovo. By the end of 1998, the southern Serbian province of Kosovo was ravaged by the 
escalating arm strive between Serbian security forces and ethnic-Albanian guerilla, Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA). The efforts of the international community to prevent new 
atrocities and an upcoming humanitarian disaster already seen in the region few years 
earlier, resulted in the UN Security Council-unauthorized NATO aerial campaign against 
Serbia. During “the humanitarian bombing”1, the crisis escalated, generating approximately 
one million refugees, mainly Albanians, causing mass destruction and civilian deaths by 
                                                 
1 A phrase allegedly coined by the former Czech president Vaclav Havel. 
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Serbian forces and KLA, on the ground, and by NATO, from the air. NATO’s victory in 
the conflict and Serbia’s withdrawal from the province were qualified by the Alliance as an 
accomplishment of the proclaimed humanitarian goals and a reverse of ethnic cleansing of 
Albanians, masterminded by the embattled Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević. As a result, 
the international administration under the lead of UN was established to rule Kosovo until 
the final agreement on its status is reached. 
 With the 9/11 terrorist attacks and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that followed, the 
world’s political and military attention was diverted away from the Balkans and Kosovo. 
However, the lack of attention did not mean that problems in this part of the globe were 
suddenly resolved. On the contrary, since the arrival of the international administration, 
Kosovo turned out to be the most dangerous place in Europe for ethnic minorities, where 
the violations of basic human rights assumed the organized form on everyday basis. 
 Being free of Serbian rule, the previously oppressed Albanian majority turned on to 
retribution against Kosovo Serbs and other minorities, mainly Roma, who they perceived 
as Serbian collaborators. In 12 years of international governance in Kosovo, ethnic 
minorities have been exposed to arbitrary killings, kidnappings, expulsions, ethnic 
cleansing, physical and verbal attacks, destruction, looting, unlawful seizure of property 
and cultural heritage, deprivation of and segregation in public services, and extremely 
limited freedom of movement. These profound and systematic human rights violations 
have been embodied in some monstrous and bizarre phenomenon such as the organized 
harvesting and trafficking of kidnapped Serbs’ organs, WW2-like minority ghettos 
surrounded with barbed wire, compulsory military escorts for minorities, and round-the-
clock military surveillance of Serbian religious and cultural sites. 
 Paradoxically, all this is happening under the heavy international civilian and 
military presence on the ground, whose primary mission is to protect minority human 
rights, enforce security for everybody and enable the return of all displaced persons. 
UNMIK, OSCE, Eulex, Kfor and other international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, all part of the international administration in Kosovo, spend hundreds of 
millions of euros on programs and strategies trying to achieve these objectives. From the 
situation described above, one finds hard to derive an opinion that could brand their 
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mission as prevailingly successful. The establishment of provisional authorities, which 
were intended to empower the people of Kosovo, has not improved the overall situation 
significantly. Dominated by Albanians, sometimes even by those who are involved in 
crimes against minorities, showed to be deeply flawed and biased toward non-Albanians. 
They are neither able nor willing to protect basic human rights of minorities or to punish 
those who jeopardize them. Impunity became a connecting word for crimes, from petty 
robberies to killings, in which victims are non-Albanians. 
 In February 2008, Kosovo Albanians unilaterally declared independence from 
Serbia, backed by major Western powers. The newly created situation additionally strained 
barely existing relations between Priština and Belgrade, which rejects the independence, as 
well as between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Non-Albanians, especially Serbs and 
Roma, feel angst about their future in the self-proclaimed country, as Kosovo remains a 
deeply divided society in the permanent state of frozen conflict. 
 
Subject significance 
 
 When the Kosovo crisis was peaking in 1998 and 1999, it was a subject of great 
political, media and academic attention. Hundreds of books, papers and articles on human 
rights violations and the NATO intervention in Kosovo were written. Somehow, when 
international peace forces entered the province and the UN took over administration, the 
interest for Kosovo suddenly plunged. Ever since, human rights in Kosovo have only been 
the focus of human rights watchdogs, such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty 
International, other international organizations present on the ground and local media 
outfits. 
The thesis hopes to show that human rights violations are still present in Kosovo 
and that the issue was not resolved with the NATO military intervention and subsequent 
establishment of the international administration. In that respect, this thesis is an attempt to 
fill the information gap about Kosovo that has been widening throughout the past decade.                         
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Methodology 
 
This Master’s thesis is a case study by its nature. It aims to examine key 
developments in the area of human rights in Kosovo, after the military intervention of 
NATO in 1999. Acknowledging the fact that the theoretical corpus of human rights is large 
and fluid, the thesis will address those aspects of human rights as defined by the theoretical 
framework. The research will focus on non-Albanian ethnicities (Serbs and Roma, chiefly) 
as the current minority communities inside overwhelmingly Albanian-populated Kosovo. 
Simultaneously, the thesis will look into the role of the international community in post-
war Kosovo, its institutions and organizations present on the ground (UNMIK, OSCE, 
Kfor, Eulex) and try to identify and critically assess their influence on various 
developments. It will attempt to point out both potential successes and failures, drawing out 
the reasons for them. 
To conduct this analysis, a variety of sources will be scrutinized. The most 
important component will consist of various reports on human rights in Kosovo, compiled 
and produced by the international administration and international organizations on the 
ground. Especially significant will be reports of human rights watchdogs, Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International, which contain the most comprehensive and substantial 
accounts on human rights in Kosovo. Reports of other international organizations, such as 
the International Crisis Group and the Minority Rights Group International, will be 
frequently referred to as well. 
In the construction of the theoretical framework, the thesis will heavily rely on the 
most significant UN and European documents on human and minority rights, as well as on 
the documents directly related to Kosovo, such as the UN Security Council Resolution 
1244 and the Constitutional Framework. For the definition of minority rights, particularly 
important will be Ethnicity and Group Rights, a collection of papers by prominent 
academics in the field, edited by Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka. 
The thesis will also refer to journalistic pieces, such as newspaper articles and 
magazine reports, and audiovisual materials, such as documentaries and TV reports, to 
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quote statements and depict initial reactions of crucial individuals, mainly political leaders, 
which are of significance to particular situations and cases. 
Important numerical data, i.e. economic, social and demographic indicators, will be 
gathered from the sources mentioned above, as well as from publications by, among others, 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the CIA. 
Naturally, not all the sources will have the same significance for the production of 
the thesis. Criteria on which the selection will be made is relevance to the topic, up-to-date 
character, amount of empirical data, and credibility of the source. An applied approach in 
the thesis will be the combined theoretical and empirical-analytical. Initially, a theoretical 
framework structure will be established on the ground of applicable theories, which will 
then be filled and shaped by empirical data and concrete findings. In that respect, the thesis 
should be more of an author-oriented than a theory-oriented character. 
This thesis is not without limitations. The major one is the absence of field research 
by the author that deprives the thesis of a personal, first-hand insight into the examined 
issues. Another one is the lack of reference to Albanian-language sources due to the 
author’s inability to speak or understand the language. 
 
Overview of literature 
 
 Since the assessment of minority human rights in Kosovo is the core content of the 
thesis, the most valuable and most frequently used literature for its production will be 
reports by the human rights and minority rights watchdogs. Being international, they tend 
to have significantly higher unbiased approach in gathering, processing and interpreting 
data concerning particular issues related to the topic than local governmental or non-
governmental organizations. Unlike them, human rights organizations, such as Human 
Rights Watch or Amnesty International, also have large experience and resources that 
enables them to substantially research and report on all aspects of human rights, providing 
the most comprehensive insight possible. 
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In that respect, Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule2 by Clive 
Baldwin from Minority Rights Group International might not be the most facts and figures-
abundant account of human rights in Kosovo, but it is for sure highly concise and 
comprehensive. Baldwin, a practicing human rights lawyer and the member of the OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo from 2000 to 2002, in 30-plus pages of his analysis successfully 
identifies key problematic areas of human rights in Kosovo, evaluates the role, actions and 
results of the international administration, and draws out recommendations on how to 
improve the overall situation of minorities. He additionally enriches his study with a short 
historical background of Kosovo, defines and profiles its minority communities and 
outlines the structure and crucial characteristics of the international presence there. The 
author’s distinctive quality is the ability to precisely underline particular concrete events 
that reflect and explain the overall grave situation of human rights of Kosovo’s minorities. 
Failure to protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 20043 by Human 
Rights Watch, is without a doubt the most substantial study of the anti-minority riots in 
March 2004. Its core is a detailed, hour-to-hour description of Albanian mob rioting in 10 
municipalities across Kosovo with precise data on victims and destroyed property. The 
report also analyzes events that led to the violence and public mood in the eve of the riots. 
Finally, the report summarizes the status the minorities in the aftermath of the riots. 
As a follow-up to this report, HRW published another one two years later titled Not 
on the Agenda: The Continuing Failure to Address Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 
2004.4 It deals with results of the international administration and provisional authorities in 
prosecuting those who organized, staged and participated in the March 2004 riots. The 
report thoroughly examines the response of the UNMIK police and Kosovo Police Service 
(KPS) during and after the riots, and the subsequent reactions of both international and 
local judicial systems. The study contains valuable accounts on how impunity in Kosovo, 
                                                 
2 Baldwin, Clive. “Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule”. Minority Rights Group 
International. London. 2006. Available at: http://www.minorityrights.org/1072/reports/minority-rights-in-
kosovo-under-international-rule.html 
3 Human Rights Watch. “Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004”. Volume 16, 
No.6(D). July 2004. Available at: http://www.forumnvo.org.rs/docs/analize/Anti-
minority%20violence%20in%20Kosovo.pdf 
4 Human Rights Watch. “Not on the Agenda: Failures to Address Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 
2004”. Volume 18, No.4(D). May 2006. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/05/29/not-agenda 
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especially in cases where victims are members of minorities, is a direct consequence of 
flawed and complicated judiciary. 
Prisoners in our own homes5 by Amnesty International is also a report about the 
status of minorities based on the organization’s field research. It focuses on issues such as 
freedom of movement, social and economic rights, and rights to return. Like the majority of 
other reports, this one also stresses the problem of impunity, which is one of the essential 
problems in areas of minorities’ security and return. Nevertheless, what differentiates this 
study from those alike is that it deals with economic and social status of minority 
communities, which is either often neglected or not addressed in this particular form. 
OSCE Mission in Kosovo has a task to report about the situation on human rights, 
specifically those of minorities. Therefore, it is not surprising that this organization is able 
to deliver most detailed reports on the topic. Besides annual reports that will be used in this 
thesis, a particular one extensively covers minority communities. Kosovo Communities 
Profiles6 is a capital, 300-page long study that contains an in-depth analysis of 
characteristics, status and structure of all minority communities in Kosovo. Issues of 
employment and socio-economic situation, security and freedom of movement, return and 
reintegration, access to municipal services and public utilities are among those examined in 
respect to every community. Furthermore, the report provides detailed demographic 
statistics for every municipality in which a particular community is present. 
Kosovo 2010 Progress Report7 compiled by the European Commission is an annual 
report compiled by the European Commission. It is one of the rare comprehensive accounts 
on the economic system of Kosovo, which is a useful starting basis when social and 
economic rights of minorities are evaluated, especially because information is concise, 
clear-cut and enriched with essential statistic data. The report also scrutinizes issues of 
                                                 
5 Amnesty International, “Prisoners in our Own Homes: Amnesty International’s concerns for the human 
rights in Kosovo/Kosova”. April 2003. Available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/010/2003/en/4172c5e4-d702-11dd-b0cc-
1f0860013475/eur700102003en.pdf 
6 OSCE. “Kosovo Communities Profiles”. OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 2010. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/75450 
7 European Commission. “Kosovo 2010 Progress Report”. 9 November 2010. Brussels. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/ks_rapport_2010_en.pdf 
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justice, freedom and security, border management and asylum, and criminal activities such 
as money laundering, drug trafficking and terrorism. 
Apart from reports and other literature used in the research about human rights of 
minorities in Kosovo, another group of sources, which does not directly relate to the topic 
but is required for the development of the theoretical framework, will be referred to. Since 
the form and content of human rights and minority rights are defined in binding or non-
binding international documents, such as charters, conventions, convents and declarations, 
those will be used the most. Nevertheless, two academic pieces were particularly important 
for the proper and accurate defining of key terms researched in this thesis. 
Ethnicity and Group Rights,8 edited by Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, is a 
collection of contributions of 20 authors. The volume provides a wide spectrum of 
theoretical considerations and discussions about the meaning of ethnicity, group rights, 
toleration, group representation, and dynamics of exclusion and inclusion. Authors argue 
ideas such as human diversity, non-liberal constitutionalism, and self-determination. They 
also explore legal solutions and practical instruments for protection of rights of groups 
based on ethnicity, culture, religion and/or language. What makes these theoretical 
constructions perfectly applicable to Kosovo’s case is that they are created in the light of 
surging ethno-national conflicts in the post-Cold War world during the 1990s and out of the 
need to protect ethnic minorities in newly established countries without democratic 
tradition. The issues of minorities arising from the conflict in Kosovo and its aftermath are 
certainly of such sort. 
Elements of a Theory of Human Rights9 by Amartia Sen, inspects human rights 
from the position of law, ethics, morality, and history. Sen is trying to frame the idea of 
human rights into one comprehensive theory and to identify elements comprising it. Her 
primary point of view is from the “public reasoning” of human rights, meaning that focus is 
on how ideas of human rights appear in reality and how they are exercised in practice. 
                                                 
8 Shapiro, Ian and Will Kymlicka. „Ethnicity and Group Rights“. New York Univeristy Press. New York and 
London. 1997. 
9 Sen, Amartya. “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights”. Publishing Inc. Philosophy & Public Affairs 32, 
No.4. Blackwell 2004. Available at: http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/asenETHR.pdf 
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 This chapter contains an overview of theoretical considerations and legal definitions 
on which a rationale for the assessment of minority human rights in Kosovo will be based. 
It will first briefly explain the development of the human rights ideal and then move on to 
review the most relevant documents on human rights. The scope of these documents will 
range from the most general ones, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to 
those that exclusively and directly address human rights in Kosovo. Additionally, the 
theoretical framework will identify and define the term minority communities, explain how 
Kosovo’s disputed status will be referred to in this thesis, and provide a structural insight of 
the international administration and the provisional authorities in Kosovo. 
 
1.1. Definition and content of human rights 
 
When talking about the theoretical aspect of human rights, one has to keep in mind 
that there is no single or general theory that shapes the phenomenon. It is more accurate to 
talk about the doctrine of human rights instead, which comprises elements of particular 
political, sociological, philosophical, and economic theories and concepts, as well as 
postulates enshrined within various international and national charters, resolutions, 
declarations, constitutions, laws and other documents. In that respect, human rights 
represent a cumulative and constantly growing multi-component doctrine of an 
interdisciplinary character.  They can be defined as: 
basic moral guarantees that people in all countries and cultures allegedly have 
simply because they are people. Calling these guarantees “rights” suggests that they 
attach to particular individuals who can invoke them, that they are of high priority, 
and that compliance with them is mandatory rather than discretionary. Human 
rights are frequently held to be universal in the sense that all people have and 
should enjoy them, and to be independent in the sense that they exist and are  
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available as standards of justification and criticism whether or not they are 
recognized and implemented by the legal system or officials of a country.10 
  
The very foundation of human rights rests upon moral universalism, which is trans-
cultural and trans-historical.11 These convictions are mainly prescribed to Aristotle and the 
Stoics. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle supports the argument of the existence of the 
natural moral order and differs between natural justice and legal justice, where the later 
one is “that which has the same validity everywhere and does not depend upon 
acceptance.”12 In centuries to follow, Christian theologians were the major promoters of 
moral universalism, though in an altered version, which was more acceptable to the 
postulates of religion.13 
Further theoretical and conceptual development of rights that resemble the 
contemporary idea of human rights occurred in the 17th and 18th century, when John Locke 
and Immanuel Kant incepted and shaped the doctrine of natural law. In his Two Treatises 
of Government, Locke insists on the argument that individuals possess natural rights, which 
are independent of the political recognition granted to them by the state. He argues that 
these rights, i.e. life, liberty and property, are given by God; they preexisted the 
constitution of any form of political community, and the duty of political authority in a 
sovereign state is to protect them. Locke’s contribution to the doctrine of human rights is 
that he set the precedent by establishing legitimate political authority upon rights 
foundation. Immanuel Kant’s ideas are prominent in contemporary philosophical 
justifications of human rights, foremost because of the ideals of equality and moral 
autonomy of rational human beings. These ideals echoed the general sentiment of the 
Enlightenment, the era these two lived in.14 
Though the certain notions and elements of human rights, such as the right to life, 
liberty, and property, span throughout a period of over two thousand years, it had not been 
                                                 
10 Nickel, James. Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on the Universal  Declaration of 
Human Rights, Berkeley; University of California Press, 1987. pp:561-562. 
11 Fagan, Andrew. “Human Rights”. University of Essex. 2003. Available at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/ 
12 Aristotle. “Nicomachean Ethics”. WLC Books 2009. pp:189. 
13 Fagan, Andrew. “Human Rights”. University of Essex. 2003. Available at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/ 
14 Ibid. 
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earlier than after WW2 that the doctrine of human rights was substantially developed and 
normatively shaped. 
It started in 1948 when the General Assembly of the newly founded United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Still under profound influence of the 
recent atrocities committed in the Holocaust, the world decided it is time to officially 
proclaim certain rights that will be applicable to every single human being on the planet 
and binding for all countries, states and political authorities of any kind. “All human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights”, states the first article of the Declaration.15 
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”, stipulates the Article 3.16 
The Declaration, composed of 30 articles, goes beyond mere listing of millenniums-old 
ideals. It prohibits, among others, torture, slavery, arbitrary arrest, racial, sexual, ethnical, 
religious and political discrimination, and introduces rights of free movement, freedom of 
thought, freedom of expression, rights to education, work, social and health protection, and 
the right to form and have a family.17 The significance of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is that for the first time the issue of human rights became not only a matter 
of moral and ethics but also a matter of law.18 
In 1950, the then-newly established Council of Europe drafted the Convention of 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Convention reflects the 
nature of the Universal Declaration and reaches even further by setting and regulating the 
functions of the European Court of Human Rights, as the most prominent judicial 
institution in charged for the protection of human rights on the continent.19 
Finally, in 1966 the General Assembly of the United Nation adopted the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant heavily relies on the 
stipulations in the Universal Declaration, elaborating, expending and legally strengthening 
                                                 
15 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, Article 1. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml 
16 Ibid, Article3. 
17 Ibid, Article 1-28. 
18 Fagan, Andrew. “Human Rights”. University of Essex. 2003. Available at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/ 
19 “Convention of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, Article 19-51. Available at: 
http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/normativa%20europea/Convenzione%20europea%20diri
tti%20delluomo.pdf 
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its meaning. For example, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that was 
previously “prohibited” is transformed into “will be prohibited by law.”20 
These documents - the Declaration, the Convention and the Covenant – are the 
three milestones on which the entire contemporary doctrine of human rights is based. Since 
their creation, they have been used as references or direct sources of national and 
international legislation for the protection of human rights. 
 
1.2. Definition and content of minority rights 
 
 Minority rights can be defined as group-differentiated rights that stem from group 
distinctness. They are rights that are “granted to the members of a certain group to enable 
them to continue preserving and giving expression to their distinct identity.”21 Minority 
groups can be based on myriad of features, such as lifestyle groups (e.g., homosexuals), 
advocacy groups (e.g., environmentalists), or other identity groups (e.g., women, the 
disabled). Nevertheless, ethnicity, together with culture, language and and/or religion, is 
the key aspect on which minority rights focus. This is understandable in the sense that 
ethnic groups have displayed greater potential to cause political violence or even 
secession.22    
 The end of the Cold War and subsequent emergence of new states and ethnic 
conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe raised the issue of interethnic 
relations and especially the problem of protection of ethnic minorities on the new political 
map of the continent. Newly created countries, such as those in the former Yugoslavia or 
Soviet Union, suddenly faced a problem of newly created minorities within their territories. 
Without the appropriate legislative framework and instruments that would define relations 
between the central state and minority communities, adding the lack of democratic tradition 
                                                 
20 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, Article 20. Available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm 
21 Saban, Ilan. “Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework for Analysis and the Case of 
Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel”. Journal of the International Law and Politics. 2 Jun 2005. pp:888. 
Available at: http://law.haifa.ac.il/faculty/lec_papers/saban/NYUmr.pdf 
22 Shapiro, Ian and Will Kymlicka. „Ethnicity and Group Rights“. New York Univeristy Press. New York and 
London. 1997. pp:10. 
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as a consequence of decades-long Communist rule, these new states were prone to 
oppression of ethnic minorities which, in some cases, as a response, led to brutal armed 
conflicts.23 
 The situation prompted a need for a far more detailed legislation on the issue of 
minority rights protection, which could not avoid stepping in to the area of human rights in 
general. The earliest formal provisions partially dealing with the rights of minorities were 
created even before the political changes in Europe occurred, at the end of 1980s and in the 
early 1990s. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
from 1969 covers groups based on “national or ethnic origin,”24 and the Genocide 
Convention from 1951 applies to national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups.25 
However, the first document to address substantially the issue of ethnic minorities 
and their rights was the Copenhagen Document adopted by the OSCE in 1991. The 
representatives of 34 European countries agreed upon the Document that reaffirms their 
commitment to the respect of human rights enshrined in previous documents by the United 
Nations and the Council of Europe, but also devoted significant attention to the rights of 
minorities. “Persons belonging to national minorities have the right to exercise fully and 
effectively their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in 
full equality before the law”,26 stipulates the Document. It also binds “participating States” 
to “adopt, where necessary, special measures for the purpose of ensuring to persons 
belonging to national minorities full equality with the other citizens in the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”27 In particular, the Document 
grants rights: 
to use freely their mother tongue in private as well as in public; to establish and 
maintain their own educational, cultural and religious institutions, organizations or 
                                                 
23 Shapiro, Ian and Will Kymlicka. „Ethnicity and Group Rights“. New York Univeristy Press. New York and 
London. 1997. pp:3.  
24 “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”, Article 1. Available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cerd.pdf 
25 “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, Article 2. Available at: 
http://www.oas.org/dil/1948_Convention_on_the_Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_Genocide.
pdf 
26 “Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, Article 
31. Available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304 
27 Ibid, Article 32. 
 31
associations, which can seek voluntary financial and other contributions as well as 
public assistance, in conformity with national legislation; to profess and practice 
their religion, including the acquisition, possession and use of religious materials, 
and to conduct religious educational activities in their mother tongue; to establish 
and maintain unimpeded contacts among themselves within their country as well as 
contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States with whom they share a 
common ethnic or national origin, cultural heritage or religious beliefs; to 
disseminate, have access to and exchange information in their mother tongue; to 
establish and maintain organizations or associations within their country and to 
participate in international non-governmental organizations.28 
  
The Declaration on Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, adopted in 1992 by the General Assembly of the UN, is often 
characterized as a watershed document in protection of minority rights. Referring to the 
Article 27 from the International Covenant on Political and Social Rights and to the 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief, the Declaration affirms that “states shall protect the existence and the 
national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their 
respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.”29 
The same article obliges signatory states to “adopt appropriate legislative and other 
measures to achieve those ends.”30 Among the listed rights in the Declaration, the foremost 
ones are those concerning the use of a minority’s language, and free practicing and 
profession of religion and culture. Rights to free movement, association, communication, 
and spread of information are also included.31 
 The Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities drafted by the 
Council of Europe in 1995 reaches further in defining minority rights and the means for 
their protection. It is the first international documents that explicitly links minority rights 
                                                 
28 “Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, Article 
32. Available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304 
29 “Declaration on Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities”, Article 1. 
Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinoritiesDeclarationen.pdf 
30 Ibid. Article 1. 
31 Ibid. Article 2-6. 
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with human rights by declaring that “the protection of national minorities and the rights and 
freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities forms an integral part of the 
international protection of human rights, and as such falls within the scope of international 
co-operation.”32 The Framework Convention does not only insist on the normative 
necessity to protect minority rights but clearly says “any discrimination based on belonging 
to a national minority shall be prohibited.”33 The rights to publicly use the language or 
freely practice the religion are supported with concrete obligatory instructions on how to 
achieve this. For example: 
In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in 
substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavour to 
ensure, as far as possible and within the framework of their education systems, that 
persons belonging to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught 
the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language.34 
 
In the same respect, though not directly, the United Nations Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions from 2005 deals with 
the protection of minority rights, i.e. in its cultural aspect. The Convention recognizes the 
significance of minorities’ cultures as an important feature of the world’s overall cultural 
diversity by stating that “the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions presuppose the recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures, 
including the cultures of persons belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples.”35 
In 1999, the OSCE High Commission for National Minorities together with the 
Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations and the Raoul Walenberg Institute of Human Rights 
assembled a team of renowned experts in the filed of human rights to produce the Lund 
Recommendations, which give concrete and practical suggestions on how governments can 
improve participation of minorities in public life. The Recommendations addresses an array 
                                                 
32 “Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities”, Article 1. Available at: 
http://www.florina.org/rainbow/framework_convention_e.pdf 
33 Ibid. Article 4. 
34 Ibid. Article 14. 
35 “Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions”, Article 3.1. 
Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf 
 33
of instruments and solution such as reserved parliamentary seats and quotas in public 
administration; adjustments to the electoral system that enable members of minorities to be 
elected; specific power-sharing arrangements on the local level; and the creation of 
consultative and advisory bodies for minority issues.36 The distinctive quality of the 
Recommendations is in the last aspect – consultative and advisory bodies – it introduces a 
beneficial instrument of communication and coordination between the central state 
authority and minorities.37 
 
1.3. Human rights and minority rights in documents related to Kosovo 
 
 The foundations of international military and civilian presence in Kosovo are set in 
the Resolution 1244, adopted by the UN Security Council in June 1999. Besides the 
definitions concerning tasks and obligations of the military and civilian mission, the 
significant portion of the Resolution is devoted to human rights. “Protecting and promotion 
of human rights”38 is one of the main responsibilities of the international administration, as 
well is the task to “establish a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons 
can return home in safety.”39 This goal is emphasized as crucial by being mentioned three 
more times throughout the Resolution. 
 The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo was 
promulgated in 2001 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the supreme 
civilian authority in Kosovo, as the de facto constitution of the province under international 
administration. Chapter 3 states that “the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government shall 
observe and ensure internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
named in key international documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
                                                 
36 “The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life”. 
Foundationa of Inter-Ethnic Relations. Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations. 1999. Available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/minority/docs/Lund_Recommendations.pdf 
37 Unangst, Megan Folk. “Minority Inclusion in Policymaking in Kosovo: The Creation and Role of the 
Consultative Council for Community”. Central European University, Department of Public Policy. Budapest 
2009, pp:9-10. Available at: http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2009/unangst_megan.pdf 
38 “UN Security Council Resolution 1244”, Annex 2.6. 10 Jun 1999. Available at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/N9917289.pdf  
39 Ibid, Paragraph 9c. 
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the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Chapter 4 of the Constitutional 
Framework defines rights of all ethnic, religious and linguistic communities in Kosovo set 
in force to “preserve, protect and express their ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 
identity.” Some of those rights, among others, are right to: 
- Use their language and alphabets freely, including before the courts, agencies, 
and other public bodies in Kosovo; 
- Receive education in their own language; 
- Enjoy equal opportunity with respect to employment in public bodies at all 
levels and with respect to access to public services at all levels; 
- Enjoy unhindered contacts among themselves and with members of their 
respective Communities within and outside of Kosovo; 
- Promote respect for Community traditions; 
- Preserve sites of religious, historical, or cultural importance to the Community, 
in cooperation with relevant public authorities; 
- Receive and provide public health and social services, on a nondiscriminatory 
basis, in accordance with applicable standards; 
- Operate religious institutions.40 
Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, the provisional 
Parliament enacted the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. Essentially, the Constitution 
is the expanded version of the Constitutional Framework, with more accurately defined 
rights of minority communities and mechanisms for their implementation. They are 
included in Chapter 2, Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, as well as in Chapter 3, Rights 
of Communities and Their Members. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN. Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-
Government in Kosovo, Chapter 4.4. 15 May 2001. Available at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf 
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1.4. Definition of minority communities 
 
 Due to Kosovo’s disputed status, with Kosovo Serb’s and Kosovo Albanian’s 
gravelly confronted views on the issue, the international administration intentionally 
avoided to refer to any of the ethnic groups as a minority. Therefore, the weighty 
documents, such as the Constitutional Framework41, and the Constitution42, rather use the 
term community that describes a group based on ethnicity, religion and/or language, 
without inclinations to their minority or majority status. However, taking into account that 
around 90 percent of the population in Kosovo is Albanian, all other ethnic groups in fact 
have the de facto status of minorities. Therefore these groups will be referred to as minority 
communities in this thesis. The largest minority communities in Kosovo are Serbs, and 
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE), with constitutionally recognized communities of 
Bosniaks, Goranis, and Turks. 
 Serbs are the largest minority community in Kosovo, numbering between 100,00043 
and 111,00044, which is roughly five percent of the population. They speak the Serbian 
language and affiliate exclusively with Orthodox Christianity. Prior to the withdrawal of 
the Serbian forces and the establishment of the international administration in 1999, the 
number of Serbs was significantly higher, around 300,000. Almost 200,000 of them left 
mainly to Serbia, either willingly because of fear for their security or were forcefully 
displaced. Serbs are the majority population in the three northern municipalities of Zvečan, 
Leposavić and Zubin Potok, including the northern part of divided city Mitrovica, and in 
                                                 
41 See “Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo”, Chapter 4. Available at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf 
42 See “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo”, Chapter 3. Available at: 
http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf 
43 Amnesty International, “Prisoners in our Own Homes: Amnesty International’s concerns for the human 
rights in Kosovo/Kosova”. pp:4. April 2003. Available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/010/2003/en/4172c5e4-d702-11dd-b0cc-
1f0860013475/eur700102003en.pdf 
44 Statistical Office of Kosovo. “Ndryshimet demografike të popullsisë së Kosovës në periudhën 1948-2006” 
(Demographic changes of the population of Kosovo in the period 1948-2006). Priština. 2008. pp:7. Available 
at: http://esk.rks-gov.net/esk 
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the southern municipality of Štrpce. Elsewhere in Kosovo, Serbs live in mono-ethnic rural 
villages or under the Kfor protection in majority Albanian urban areas.45 
 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, often jointly referred to as the RAE community, 
number to around 24,000 people.46 Since 1999, around 45,000 RAE have been displaced in 
Serbia or Montenegro or live in Macedonia as refugees. Prior to the 1990s, all three 
communities were considered to be Roma. During the Kosovo war, and especially after it, 
they started to differ between themselves. Since Serbian- and Roma-speaking Kosovo 
Roma are considered by Albanians to be ‘Serbian collaborators”47 during the war, 
Albanian-speaking Roma started to define themselves as a distinctive ethnic group, 
Ashkali, to avoid retribution. Furthermore, Egyptians, who also speak Albanian, claim their 
descent from ancient Egypt. All three groups are nominally Muslims. Roma are today 
overwhelmingly concentrated in areas inhabited by Serbs; Ashkali live alongside 
Albanians, while Egyptians are mainly concentrated in the cities of Đakovica and Peć, with 
usually higher living standards.48 
Bosniaks belong to the group of Slavic Muslims. Bosniaks identify themselves with 
the Muslim population of Bosnia and Sandžak region in Serbia, which adopted the name in 
the 1990s. Prior to this, in socialist Yugoslavia, they were regarded as “Muslims in the 
ethnic sense”.49 Before 1999, the community numbered around 35,000, while today it has 
been reduced to around 20,000. Bosniaks themselves claim that their community in Kosovo 
consisted of at least 100,000 people in 1991, and of approximately 57,000 currently. They 
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at: http://esk.rks-gov.net/esk 
47 During the war, Serbian forces were using Roma to transport and bury killed Albanians. 
48 Amnesty International, “Prisoners in our Own Homes: Amnesty International’s concerns for the human 
rights in Kosovo/Kosova”. April 2003. pp:7. Available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/010/2003/en/4172c5e4-d702-11dd-b0cc-
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49 The term was introduced for the first time in the 1961 Yugoslavian population census. 
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live in both Albanian-populated areas (Đakovica, Uroševac), as well as in majority Serbian 
areas (the northern Mitrovica, in a neighborhood called Bošnjačka mahala).50 
Gorani are also Slavic Muslims, concentrated in the municipality Dragaš, in the 
mountainous Gora region, probably the most remote area in Kosovo. The Serbian-speaking 
and loyal to Serbia after 1999, Gorani were and still are prosecuted by Albanians. This 
caused the reduction of their number from 12,000 in 1999 to approximately 6,000 today.51 
Turks are completely concentrated in the Prizren municipality, numbering to around 
12,000. They are well integrated in the social and cultural life of the overwhelmingly 
Albanian populated town.52 
 
1.5. Approaches in defining Kosovo’s status and institutions 
 
 Kosovo is the subject of territorial dispute between the Republic of Serbia and the 
self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, in which both claim sovereignty over the territory. 
The Republic of Serbia considers “the Province of Kosovo and Metohija53 as an integral 
part of the territory of Serbia, that has the status of a substantial autonomy within the 
sovereign state of Serbia.”54 On the other hand, ever since the unilateral declaration of 
independence on 17 February 2008, the Republic of Kosovo perceives itself as “an 
independent, sovereign, democratic, unique and indivisible state.”55 
                                                 
50 Baldwin, Clive. “Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule”. Minority Rights Group 
International. London. 2006. pp:9. Available at: http://www.minorityrights.org/1072/reports/minority-rights-
in-kosovo-under-international-rule.html 
51 Baldwin, Clive. “Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule”. Minority Rights Group 
International. London. 2006. pp:9. Available at: http://www.minorityrights.org/1072/reports/minority-rights-
in-kosovo-under-international-rule.html 
52 Amnesty International, “Prisoners in our Own Homes: Amnesty International’s concerns for the human 
rights in Kosovo/Kosova”. April 2003. pp:6. Available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/010/2003/en/4172c5e4-d702-11dd-b0cc-
1f0860013475/eur700102003en.pdf 
53 Official Serbian name for Kosovo. Term Metohija is derived from the Greek word metochion, which means 
monastic possession. 
54 “Constitution of the Republic of Serbia”, Preamble. Available at: 
http://www.predsednik.rs/mwc/epic/doc/ConstitutionofSerbia.pdf 
55 “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo”, Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 1. Available at: 
http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf 
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 This thesis will refer to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, 
in full compliance with the effective United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, 
which “reaffirms the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia56” and “substantial autonomy and 
meaningful self-administration for Kosovo”57. Therefore, Kosovo will be used as a term, 
which defines the province of the Republic of Serbia currently under the administration of 
the United Nations as detailed in the Resolution 1244. Furthermore, all institutions in 
present-day Kosovo, “which are in hands of Kosovo’s leaders and civil servants,”58 will be 
referred to as the provisional authorities or, as their official name is, Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG).59 
 However, taking into account that under the international administration Kosovo 
developed a substantial institutional structure of self-government and has been recognized 
by 7560 member-states of the UN, the thesis acknowledges the fact that Kosovo is de facto 
an independent territorial entity over which Serbia currently has no effective sovereignty. 
 
1.6. Definition and structure of the international administration 
 
 The term international administration will be used in the thesis to jointly address all 
international organizations and institutions established in Kosovo by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 and subsequent documents based on it. In that respect, the 
international administration in Kosovo refers to UNMIK, Kfor, OSCE and Eulex, and other 
structures derived out or under their competencies. 
                                                 
56 Republic of Serbia is the legal successor of both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2003) and the 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006). 
57 “UN Security Council Resolution 1244”. 10 Jun 1999. pp:2Available at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/N9917289.pdf 
58 Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN. “Constitutional Framework for Provisional 
Self-Government in Kosovo”. 15 May 2001. pp:3. Available at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf 
59 As defined by the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo.  
60 The situation on the 19 May 2011 according to The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo. 
“Countries that have recognized the Republic of Kosova”. Available at: http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33 
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 The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo or UNMIK is the interim 
civilian administration in Kosovo, placed under the authority of the UN.61 The head of 
UNMIK is also the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN. Initially, 
UNMIK was based on a four-pillar structure; Pillar I: Police and justice; Pillar II: Civil 
administration; Pillar III: Democratization and institution building; and Pillar IV: 
Reconstruction and economic development. The first two pillars had been under direct 
auspices of UNMIK, while the third and fourth pillar was entrusted to the OSCE and the 
EU, respectively. UNMIK played a crucial role in administrating Kosovo in the first few 
years of the international rule, but its significance started to decline in 2001 and especially 
in 2004, when numerous powers were systematically transferred to the provisional 
authorities. After the installment of Eulex, which took over almost all responsibilities from 
the first pillar, UNMIK’s role was downscaled to a mere symbolic one.62 
 The Kosovo Forces or Kfor is a multinational, NATO-led peacekeeping mission in 
Kosovo, in charge of establishing a peaceful and secure environment. While UNMIK 
represents a crucial aspect of the international civilian presence in Kosovo, Kfor does so 
militarily. Beside public security, Kfor's initial mandate was to deter the possible return of 
Serbian forces to Kosovo, to disarm KLA, and to assist humanitarian relief. Today, its main 
tasks are the assistance to international and provisional authorities, demining, weapons 
destruction, border control, medical assistance and security of minorities. From the initial 
50,000-strong mission in 1999 and 2000, Kfor has been reduced to current 6,300 troops, 
with a plan for further reduction down to 5,000 in the spring of 2011. The whole territory 
of Kosovo is divided into five sectors – French, Italian, German, British, and American – 
for which armies of these five leading Kfor country-contributors are responsible 
respectively. Though both UNMIK and Kfor were established by the Resolution 1244, 
Kfor, unlike UNMIK, is not responsible to the UN.63 
                                                 
61 “UN Security Council Resolution 1244”. 10 Jun 1999. Available at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/N9917289.pdf 
62 Wet, Erika de. “The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and 
Functioning of EULEX”. American Society of International Law. The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 103, No.1. Januar 2009. pp:84. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20456723 
63 NATO. “NATO’s role in Kosovo”. 16 May 2011. Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm 
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 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission in Kosovo, or 
OSCE Mission in Kosovo, was established in 1999 “within overall framework of UNMIK 
to take the lead role in matters relating to institution- and democracy-building and human 
rights.“64 The mission’s three main fields of activities are support of democratic institutions 
and good governance, promotion of human and community rights, and improvement of 
security and public safety. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, upon its inception, was in charge 
of UNMIK's second pillar on the basis of experience that the organization gained in its 
previous work in Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia. With a staff numbering of 680 
people, it is the largest OSCE field mission. Despite being only one of the parts in 
UNMIK's structure, the significance of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo outgrew that of 
UNMIK. The major task of the OSCE in Kosovo, after UNMIK's restructuring in 2009, is 
monitoring, particularly in regard to reporting and early warning. The OSCE supervises 
and advises the provisional authorities, facilitates and funds various programs for minority 
communities, and logistically supports other international organizations, such as the 
UNHCR, the Council of Europe and the EU.65 
 The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo or Eulex is the EU justice and 
police mission in Kosovo. With staff of 3,200, it is the largest civilian mission ever 
launched under the Common Security and Defense Policy.66 Eulex was established in 
2008, after Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence and has been a matter of 
controversy, since its initial role was to replace UNMIK according to the Ahtisaari Plan. 
Since Serbia opposes Kosovo's independence, which was the key point of the Plan, it did 
not want to accept the Eulex deployment. Eventually, a compromise was reached and Eulex 
was officially set up as a part of UNMIK, though it almost completely took over its 
competences. The central aim of the mission is to assist and support the Kosovo 
authorities in the rule of law, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. 
67 
                                                 
64 OSCE. Decision No.305. 237th plenary meeting. PC Journal No.237. Agenda item 2. 1 July 1999. Available 
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65 OSCE. “Overview”. Available at: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/43378 
66 EULEX. “What is EULEX”. Available at: http://www.Eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/whatisEulex.php 
67 Wet, Erika de. “The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and 
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2. HISTORY OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS 
 
 Kosovo is a region of approximately 11,000 sq. kilometers, with an estimated 
population of two million.68 Similar to most of the Balkan Peninsula, many ethnic, 
religious and linguistic groups have inhabited it throughout history. For Serbs and 
Albanians, particularly, Kosovo is crucially important as being a central part of their 
respective identities, cultures, history and mythology. The centuries-old exclusive claims of 
the territory by each of these nations, led to the creation of a concept where in Kosovo 
there is no place for the other one and, subsequently, to a conflict that fully erupted at the 
end of the 21st century.69 
 Serbs perceive Kosovo as the cradle of their nation, culture and statehood. It is the 
place where the first Serbian state was formed in the 8th century. A few centuries later, in 
the 13th and 14th century, Serbian rulers built hundreds of churches and monasteries there, 
the most valuable part of today’s national heritage, when Serbia was the leading regional 
power throughout most of the era. It is also the place where that era abruptly ended with the 
1389 Kosovo battle, when Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Empire, occupied, and 
ruled by it for the next 450 years. Under the Ottoman servitude, the Kosovo battle evolved 
into a national myth and the single most important event in Serbian history to date.70 71 
 For Albanians, Kosovo is a part of the historic Albanian lands. Considering to have 
descended from ancient Illyrians, Albanians claim to have been in Kosovo prior to the 
arrival of Slavic tribes in the Balkans. In the early stages of Ottoman rule, they were 
fiercely rebelling, but eventually most of the population converted to Islam and was 
                                                 
68 The last census in Kosovo was conducted in April 2011, but its preliminary results were not published by 
the time the thesis went to press. The current population data in Kosovo are based on estimates made by 
OSCE and UN. 
69 Baldwin, Clive. “Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule”. Minority Rights Group 
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granted a substantial amount of autonomy by Istanbul.72 In 1878, the League of Prizren 
was founded in Kosovo as a response to the leading European powers’ intentions to cede 
Albanian-populated territories to newly emerging countries of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. 
The foundation of the League of Prizren is one of the most important events in the modern 
Albanian history. 73 
 After the First Balkan War, when Ottomans were finally driven out from most of 
the Balkans, Kosovo was absorbed by Serbia. For Serbs, this was the ultimate national 
victory, while for Albanians it was just the replacement of an occupier. Together with 
Serbia, Kosovo became a part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after WW1. During WW2, it 
was occupied by Italy. After WW2 it remained within Yugoslavia, as a socialist federal 
republic. In 1974, when a new constitution was introduced virtually transforming 
Yugoslavia from a federation into confederation, Kosovo was granted a broad autonomy, 
becoming one of the two autonomous provinces of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. 
Although officially having lower competences than other six republics of which 
Yugoslavia was comprised, Kosovo was essentially a republic within a republic, being 
equally represented in the Presidency, a collective chief of state, alongside with other 
constituent republics.74 
 In 1981, only one year after the death of Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia’s strongmen 
and symbol of unity, students of the Priština University initiated mass demonstrations 
demanding that Kosovo become a republic, separates from Yugoslavia and joins Albania.75 
At the same time, Kosovo’s Serbian population was increasingly complaining about their 
status in the province, as being growingly oppressed by the Albanian majority. Riding on 
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the surging wave of nationalism on both sides and increasing inter-ethnic distrust, then a 
little-known Communist Party official Slobodan Milošević, promoted himself as the 
ultimate Serb leader during his visit to Kosovo in 1987. Two years later, he abolished 
Kosovo’s autonomy, with power to run the province returning to Belgrade. The move was 
followed by a systematic discrimination of Albanians in the following decade. Albanian-
language media and education were substantially reduced, and Albanians were fired from 
state jobs and discriminated against when hiring for new positions. Kosovo Albanians 
responded by civil disobedience, establishing their own parallel political and educational 
institutions.76 In 1990, Kosovo’s shadow leadership with Ibrahim Rugova as its president, 
declared independence from Serbia. This act went relatively unnoticed in the international 
community and the self-proclaimed independent Kosovo was recognized only by 
Albania.77 
 One of the reasons for this was probably the fact that the world’s attention was 
focused on the disintegrating Yugoslavia and bloody conflicts emerging in Croatia and 
Bosnia. While these conflicts where concluded by the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, 
the problem of Kosovo had not been addressed.78 This increased frustration among 
Albanians who lost their faith in passive resistance proclaimed by Rugova and turned 
toward younger and arm rebellion-oriented leaders such as Hashim Thaqi and Agim Ceku. 
By the end of 1996, a small number of armed Kosovo Albanians, calling themselves 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), started to attack Serbian police and military posts and 
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vehicles in the hit-and-run manner. This militant group was formed back in 1990, but 
remained passive until the beginning of 1996.79 
 During 1998, sporadic armed clashes between the KLA and Serbian security forces 
escalated into a full-fledged war. Serbia drastically increased its military and police 
presence in the province, while more and more Albanians joined the KLA, which at that 
point contained over 10,000 armed men.80 The conflict caused major destruction, 
displacements and killings of both Albanian and Serbian civilians. Western powers, the US 
and the UK foremost, scraped the KLA from their lists of terrorist organizations in 1998 
and started to support it diplomatically and logistically.81 
After the failed attempts of the US to broker a peace deal between two sides, in 
March 1999 NATO initiated air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
goal was to force the Serbian military and police to withdraw from Kosovo. NATO 
intervened to prevent war crimes and ethnic cleansing, but these dramatically increased as a 
direct result of intervention, prompting around 800,000 people, overwhelmingly Albanians, 
to temporarily leave Kosovo.82 After the 78-day long UN Security Council-unauthorized 
aerial bombardment of Serbia, which claimed over 2,000 civilian lives and 30-billion 
dollars in damage83, Serbia agreed to withdraw from Kosovo and handover the 
administration of province to the UN. After nine years of international rule, backed by the 
major Western powers, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 
2008.84  
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3. SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
 
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” 
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3 
 
“…The responsibilities of the international security presence…will include: 
…Ensuring public safety and order…” 
- Security Council Resolution 1244, Paragraph 9, Subparagraph (d) 
 
 This chapter aims to scrutinize aspects of security and freedom of movement issues 
of the minority population; the major focus issues of the international community upon the 
establishment of its rule in Kosovo.85 The major security-related cases will be taken into 
consideration, as they most profoundly reflect a grave security situation in which Kosovo’s 
minorities are for the past 12 years. It then examines behavior and a response of the 
international administration during and after the cases occurred and focuses on the trend of 
impunity as the phenomenon that rose from their mismanagement. The last part of the 
chapter is devoted to ethnic enclaves and ghettos, another distinctive phenomenon of 
Kosovo, directly tied to the absence of security and, as a result, freedom of movement. 
 
3.1. Post-June 1999 and 2000-2001 violence 
 
 The withdrawal of Serbian police and military from Kosovo started on 10 June 
1999 and was completed in the 11 following days.86 This event marked the beginning of a 
period of roughly two and a half years during which minority communities, particularly 
Serbs and Roma, experienced most brutal violations of basic human rights, including the 
violations of the supreme human right – the right to life. In the second half of 1999 and 
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throughout 2000 and 2001, members of Kosovo’s minorities were subjected to a brutal and 
intensively violent campaign, which consisted of threats, beatings, abductions, tortures, 
arbitrary killings, expulsions, lootings, arsons and destruction of cultural heritage – for no 
other reason than their ethnic background. It is certain that some of the attacks on 
minorities can be prescribed to armed criminal gangs with opportunistic motives, but there 
are also evidence that elements of the KLA are largely responsible for post-war attacks on 
Serbs, Roma, and other non-Albanians.87 
 Between 10 June 1999 and 4 June 2000, in 4,768 attacks against members of 
minorities (4,590 attacks on Serbs, solely), 951 persons were killed, 902 of which were 
Serbs. During the same period, 903 non-Albanians were kidnapped or went missing, 869 of 
them Serbs.88 It is estimated that the number of murders of minorities was at least 50 a 
week in the summer of 1999 and three a week in October of the same year.89 
 Two particular cases depict the harsh reality of Serbs and other minorities few 
months after the arrival of the international military and civilian mission. The first one 
occurred on 17 July 1999, when 14 Serb farmers were killed while harvesting in the village 
Staro Gracko, municipality Lipljan, central Kosovo. They were shot in cold blood, from 
automatic weapons from close distance, in an already prepared ambush.90 The second is the 
case of public lynching on the streets of Priština, Kosovo’s capital. During a celebration of 
the Albanian Flag Day on 28 November 1999, the crowed pulled out of a car a Serb 
university professor from Priština, his wife and his mother-in-law. All three were severely 
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beaten, while the professor was shot dead by a handgun. The same would have happened to 
the women if the UNMIK police and Kfor did not react and disperse the lynching mob.91 
 While the violence against minorities was surging during June, July and August of 
1999, the autumn of that year saw a drop in ethnically motivated crimes and murders, only 
to take an upward turn in the first two months of 2000. In a span of five days, between 
January 12th and 17th, nine persons, all non-Albanians, were reported murdered; a Bosniak 
family of four was murdered in their home near Prizren; three Serbs were killed in Pasjan, 
the village near Gnjilane; and two Roma were killed in Đakovica while trying to protect 
their home from looting.92 
 Early February of 2000 witnessed an incident that prompted a chain of violent 
events and caused the most serious security crisis throughout Kosovo to date. On 2 
February, a clearly marked humanitarian bus belonging to the UNHCR, with 49 Kosovo 
Serbs on board, was targeted by a rocket, resulting in two people killed and three heavily 
injured. In the two following days, riots erupted in the divided city of Mitrovica, leaving 
eight people dead. It also caused the displacement of 1,650 Albanians from the Serb-
controlled northern part of the city and the reduction of Serbian population in the Albanian 
dominated southern part to only 20 people. Offices of the Red Cross, UNHCR, OSCE, 
UNMIK and Kfor were looted and burned down.93 
 As a consequence of the changes that the UNMIK police and Kfor underwent in 
terms of protection of minorities after the February violence, the number of murders 
decreased, whereas arsons became the major form of attacks on non-Albanians and their 
property. In the first half of 2000, arson attacks were mainly carried out in the wider 
Priština-region and to a lesser extent in the Gnjilane region. Serb-owned properties were hit 
the hardest, with 83 Serb houses burned, out of the 179 reported in this period.94 Though 
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attacks on property were a few times higher than the attacks on life during this period, “the 
number of murders, attempted murders and grenade attacks against ethnic minorities 
remained unacceptably high.”95 During 2000, 112 persons belonging to the minority 
communities were killed in Kosovo.96 
 The year 2001 brought a new escalation of violence against minorities, mainly 
Serbs. On 17 February, the lead bus of the Niš Express, a convoy of busses with Kosovo 
Serbs on board, was destroyed by a remote-controlled bomb planted by the road. In the 
most serious attack on minorities since 1999, 12 people, including a two-year-old child, 
died and more than 40 were injured. The convoy, escorted by Swedish soldiers from Kfor, 
was en route to Gračanica, a town in central Kosovo, where displaced Serbs intended to 
visit graves of their deceased family members and the properties they were forced to leave 
in an overwhelmingly Albanian-populated area. Only a week before the incident, another 
convoy with Serbs on board, also visiting cemeteries, found itself under heavy sniper fire, 
however nobody was injured or killed.97 The bombing of Niš Express, a classical ethnically 
motivated terrorist act, showed that extremist now were targeting not only Serbs and other 
minorities, who remained in Kosovo, but also those who fled the terror in the second half 
of 1999 and were reconsidering their return. 
Throughout the rest of the year deadly attacks on minorities continued: On 27 
February, Branka and Savita Jović, an elderly Serb couple were found beaten to death in 
Kamenica; in April and May at least three Serbs were killed in separate drive-by shootings 
in the Vitina municipality; on 5 August, a hand grenade was thrown into a Serb couple’s 
backyard in Černica, near Gjilan, killing the husband and injuring his wife; on 7 August, an 
attack on a convoy of Serb cars near Podujevo resulted in wounding of three people; on 4 
September, a Serb farmer was stabbed to death in Vrbovac near Vitina; on 28 September a 
former Serb police officer, Trajan Trajković, was shot and killed in Koprivnica near Gjilan; 
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on 30 September, a Serb woman was killed by an explosive device planted shortly 
beforehand in a field near Vitina; on 2 December, an elderly Serb woman was killed in a 
drive-by shooting as she was walking home with her husband from the train station at 
Obilić.98 Overall, 44 persons of non-Albanian ethnicity were killed during 2001 in 
ethnically motivated crimes, 30 of which were Serbs.99 
The reduction of killings and violent attacks on minorities in the two following 
years, 2002 and 2003, dropped, not as a result of improved security environment but rather 
“due to the fact that minority ethnic groups remain in physically separated 
communities.”100 However, on 13 August 2003, a particularly brutal ethnically motivated 
crime shook the Serb community in Kosovo and echoed throughout the region. While 
swimming in the river Bistrica that separates the Albanian village Zahač and the Serb 
village Goraždevac in the Peć municipality, few dozen of Serb teenagers were shot at from 
the nearby bushes. In the attack, two boys aged 12 and 19 were killed, while another four 
were heavily wounded. Attackers used automatic weapons and fled in the direction of 
Zahač after the attack.101  
 
3.2. The March 2004 riots 
 
 By the beginning of 2004 violence against minorities significantly decreased, 
especially compared to the period June 1999 – 2001. The international administration set 
up a comprehensive strategy called Standards before Status in December 2003 that defined 
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eight major areas102 in which Kosovo must achieve a substantial progress before 
negotiations about the future status take place.103 In January 2004, UNMIK’s head of 
justice and police praised the achievements of the international community and the UN in 
Kosovo as “a good example… [how] to stop ethnic cleansing and build policy instruments 
that will prevent it from occurring again.”104 
 However, less than month and a half later, almost five years after the establishment 
of the international rule, the major riots targeting mainly Serbs and Roma erupted on the 
whole territory of Kosovo: 
Forty-eight hours of rioting by Kosovo Albanians between March 17 and 18, 2004, 
involving an estimated 51,000 participants throughout Kosovo, left 19 persons 
dead, 954 wounded, and 4,100 displaced. At least 730 minority-owned homes, 27 
[Serbian] Orthodox churches and monasteries, and 10 public buildings providing 
services to minorities (including a hospital, two schools, and a post office) were 
burned and looted. The violence mainly affected Serb, Roma, Ashkali, and other 
non-Albanian minority communities living in Kosovo, including people who had 
recently returned to the province, but also had an impact on the Albanian 
community, nine of whom died during the riots.105 
  
The spark that lit the riots was sensationalist and inflammatory reporting of 
the Albanian-language media that accused Serbs for chasing four Albanian boys 
into the Ibar River after which three of them drowned. Subsequent investigation of 
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the accident by UNMIK showed that the boys probably drowned while playing by 
the river.106 
 
3.2.1. Reaction of UNMIK, Kfor, and PISG 
 
 The events of the March riots surprised and almost completely paralyzed both the 
international administration, especially its component in charge of security, and the 
provisional authorities. Within a few hours and over the course of the next two days, they 
completely lost control over Kosovo, which entirely plunged into chaos. Even if 
ineffectiveness of the international administration to protect minorities in the aftermath of 
the Kosovo war can be partially justified by inexperience and the fact that the structure was 
yet to be set up on the ground, the March 2004 riots occurred in the fifth year of the 
international governance of Kosovo. Given the scale, form and results of anti-minority 
rioting in the two days of March, the reaction of the international administration and the 
provisional authorities can be defined as a complete and profound failure. Additionally, 
irresponsible statements made by some of the highest-ranking Kosovo Albanian politicians 
in the early hours of the riots only fueled the violence and encouraged rioters to carry on 
with their rampage. 
 The reasons for the failure of the international forces, Kfor in the first place, to 
protect lives and property of minorities during the riots can be narrowed down to two – the 
lack of manpower and unwillingness to react. The first reason is a result of a flawed 
estimate of Kfor’s commanders that security situation is constantly improving, which led to 
reduction of troops from 50,000 in June 1999 to 18,500 by late 2003, a few months before 
riots erupted.107 The second reason – idleness of Kfor troops – is a more significant 
contributor to devastating consequences of the March violence. Some of the following 
cases confirm this claim: 
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- “French Kfor troops refused to come to the assistance of the Serb residents of 
Svinjare, even though their main base is located just a few hundred meters from that 
village. The entire village of Svinjare—all 137 homes—were burned to the ground 
within viewing distance of the main French Kfor base; 
- In nearby Vučitrn, located in between two main French Kfor camps, Albanian 
crowds burned sixty-nine Ashkali homes without a response from either French 
Kfor or international UNMIK police; 
- In the southern city of Prizren, German Kfor commanders refused to honor requests 
to come to the assistance of their international UNMIK police counterparts, and 
Albanian crowds destroyed all remaining vestiges of the centuries-old Serb 
presence in the city, including several religious buildings dating back to the 
fourteenth century, burning one Serb man to death in his home and leaving all 
remaining Serbs in Prizren homeless; 
- In the large town of Kosovo Polje, only a few UNMIK police and no Kfor 
personnel came to the assistance of the besieged Serbs, leaving a handful of local 
the KPS officers to protect more than one hundred Serb families scattered around 
the city. One Serb was beaten to death, and at least one hundred Serb homes were 
burned, as was the main post office, the Serbian school, the Serbian hospital, and 
the Serbian Orthodox Church; 
- In the capital Priština, Serb residents of the YU Program apartment buildings—an 
apartment complex originally built to house Serb refugees from Bosnia and 
Croatia—were besieged for hours by ethnic Albanian crowds who set their 
apartments on fire and shot at them before they were rescued by Kfor and UNMIK 
international police.”108 
The Kosovo Police Service, which overwhelmingly consists of Kosovo Albanians, 
failed even more drastically to protect minorities during the riots. Except for few cases,109 
they were bystanders while burning, looting or even killings were taking place. In a few 
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incidents, the KPS members even participated actively in organized violence. A Serb from 
Obilić, a town located a few kilometers from Priština, witnessed the KPS officers’ action 
during the rioting mob’s attack on a Serb neighborhood: “[t]he police were just standing by 
doing nothing. Later on, the police became actively involved in the demonstrations. I saw 
the KPS officers bring tires to burn the church and later help destroy homes in the 
Todorović neighborhood….I saw with my own eyes the KPS officers with the crowd, 
whatever they could find they threw inside the church and put on fire.”110 Another witness 
reported seeing a KPS policeman throwing a Molotov cocktail back at the church after it 
had bounced off the wall.111 Similar conduct of the KPS officers was reported in Priština, 
Đakovica, Bijelo Polje, Kosovo Polje, Vučitrn, Svinjare and Lipljan.112 
The political leadership of Kosovo Albanians, the most senior officials of the 
provisional authorities, also failed to respond to the situation accordingly. On the contrary, 
many politicians “initially issued statements that may have helped legitimize the violence 
in the eyes of many Albanians.”113 The speaker of the Provisional Assembly of Kosovo, 
Nexat Daci, during a parliamentary session addressing the riots, described the killed and 
injured Albanians of the fighting on 17 March as “people who died fighting for democracy 
and freedom.”114 Hashim Thaci, the leader of the Kosovo Democratic Party and the former 
KLA commander, issued a strong anti-Serb statement: “Serbs are misusing the Albanians’ 
goodwill to create an equal society for all. They don’t want to integrate in Kosovar society. 
Proof of this is yesterday’s [children’s drowning] and today’s [Mitrovica violence] events. 
Their will has remained in the previous five years only for violence against Albanians. This 
can no longer be tolerated.”115 Many other statements issued by Kosovo Albanian 
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politicians refused to condemn the violence or even to mention that Serbs are being 
primarily targeted. 
 
3.3. Climate of impunity 
 
 The most crucial reason why minorities in Kosovo have been exposed to a 
continuous campaign of attacks on life and property since the installment of the 
international administration is probably the fact that the violence and criminal activities go 
unchecked and unpunished. The way that Albanian judges handle cases caused a complete 
lost of trust in Kosovo’s judicial system in minority communities, as it is being perceived 
as deeply partial and biased. Even the international observes identified the problem that led 
the UN Special Representative to appoint international judges in politically sensitive cases, 
such as those involving ethnically motivated killings. Finally, the lack of a functional 
system of witness protection significantly hampers investigations, since those who would 
be willing to testify are afraid to do so, fearing the retribution from those who committed 
the crimes. This is especially notable in investigations where witnesses are Albanians and 
victims are non-Albanians. All these factors created a climate of impunity in which crimes, 
especially toward minorities, are being easily committed since penalties to counter them are 
hard to or never reached.116 
 Therefore, some of the most brutal and shocking crimes committed against 
minorities never received an epilogue in court. The investigation into the killing of 14 
Serbian farmers in summer 1999117 led to an arrest of Mazlum Bitiqi in 2007. He was 
released two months later due to a lack of evidence. A prominent Kosovo Serb politician 
Radmila Trajković stated that according to the UNMIK findings, the organizer of this 
crime is “a high-ranked former member of the KLA, whose arrest would destabilize the 
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situation in the province”.118 The suspect accused for shooting the Serb professor on the 
streets of Priština on the celebration of the Albanian Flag Day in 1999119 was arrested a 
month after the murder, but soon escaped from a Kfor detention facility and had not been 
seen since.120 
No suspects have been charged for the rocket propelled grenade attack in February 
2000 on the convoy of busses carrying 49 Serbs121 in which two people died.122 The 
terrorist-style bombing of the Niš Express convoy near Podujevo123 also went unpunished. 
A former KLA member Florim Ejupi was arrested in April 2001 as being the lead suspect 
in the case, but escaped from American military base Bondsteel a few days later. He was 
rearrested in Albania in 2004 and additionally charged for the killings of two UNMIK 
police officers.124 In 2008 Ejupi was sentenced for 40 years in prison for the bombing, but 
the verdict was overturned by the panel of international judges in Kosovo in 2009 and he 
was released.125 
The investigation of the monstrous killings of two teenagers and wounding four 
others on the banks of Bistrica River in 2003126 is terminated, without achieving any 
results. One of the survivors of the crime received an official reply to his query from the 
chief of Eulex in 2010, saying that “no known suspects have been identified yet, but in a 
case new evidence emerge, the investigation will be initiated again.”127 
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Generally, the period of two and a half years after the arrival of international 
mission in Kosovo, the most fatal and violent for Serbs and other minorities, is the period 
during which “the vast majority of inter-ethnic crimes (…) have resulted neither in 
identification nor arrest of suspected perpetrators, and most ethnic crimes committed in 
1999 and 2000 have not been prosecuted.”128 
 A particular failure of the international administration and the provisional 
authorities judicial institutions was the processing of the March 2004 riots. Out of 51,000 
participants in 33 major riots during the two days of March 2004, only 426 individuals 
have been accused. Out of these, 56 were considered to be “serious cases” and therefore 
handed to courts with international judges. Others were to be processed in municipal courts 
by Kosovo Albanian judges. Only 13 of 56 cases – less than a quarter – had resulted in 
final decisions, with 29 cases never reaching even pre-trial investigation stage.129 In 2008, 
after Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, Eulex took over all cases from the 
UNMIK Justice Department. By the beginning of 2010, only six cases related to the March 
violence have been investigated.130 In March 2011, the Chief prosecutor of Eulex 
announced he is dropping five cases, confirming the indictment in only one case.131 
 
3.3.1. Organ harvesting in post-war Kosovo 
 
 In December 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a 
report that unravels what could be the most horrific unpunished crime committed during 
the violent break up of Yugoslavia. On behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights of the Council of Europe, a Swiss MEP Dick Marty compiled a report that 
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describes cases of harvesting and trafficking of human organs in the aftermath of the 
Kosovo war. What is shocking about Marty’s report is the establishment of a nexus 
between organized crime, Kosovo’s leadership, and organ trafficking. 
 In sum, the report finds that throughout the second half of 1999 and first few 
months of 2000, the KLA abducted over 300 Serb civilians in Kosovo, transported them to 
three improvised illegal detention centers in Albania, where they were killed and their 
kidneys, livers and other organs had been harvested in improvised clinics.132 The report 
also identifies the Drenica Group, one of the fractions of KLA, as being responsible for the 
crimes. The head of the group during the time when the crimes were committed was 
Hashim Thaqi, the former KLA commander and current prime minister of Kosovo.133 
Additionally, Thaqi “reportedly operated with support and complicity not only from 
Albania’s formal governance structures, including the Socialist Government in power at the 
time, but also from Albania’s secret services, and from the formidable Albanian mafia.”134 
Marty identified four improvised clinics, all of them in northern Albania, where Serbs were 
illegally deprived of their organs. The procedures and methodology of organ extraction are 
thoroughly described: 
The testimonies on which we based our findings spoke credibly and consistently of 
a methodology by which all of the captives were killed, usually by a gunshot to the 
head, before being operated on to remove one or more of their organs. We learned 
that this was principally a trade in “cadaver kidneys”, i.e. the kidneys were 
extracted posthumously; it was not a set of advanced surgical procedures requiring 
controlled clinical conditions and, for example, the extensive use of anesthetic. (…) 
As and when the transplant surgeons were confirmed to be in position and ready to 
operate, the captives were brought out of the “safe house” individually, summarily 
executed by a KLA gunman, and their corpses transported swiftly to the operating 
clinic. The surgical procedures thereupon performed – cadaver kidney extractions, 
rather than surgeries on live donors – are the most common means through which 
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donor organs and tissues are acquired for transplant purposes – except for the 
criminal method of obtaining the cadavers.135 
  
Another astonishing fact Marty’s report reveals is that “all of the 
international community in Kosovo – from the Governments of the United States 
and other allied Western powers, to the EU-backed justice authorities – 
undoubtedly possess the same, overwhelming documentation of the full extent of 
the Drenica Group’s crimes, but none seems prepared to react in the face of such a 
situation and to hold the perpetrators to account.”136 They decided to turn the blind 
eye on the KLA war crimes, placing a premium on achieving a short-term political 
stability instead.137 
 If allegations from Dick Marty’s report are proven right, the case of organ 
trafficking will represent a supreme case of impunity in Kosovo. It will disclose 
extreme failures of the international administration to investigate and prosecute 
these monstrous crimes and profoundly reassess its sincerity in proclaimed devotion 
to human rights, justice and reconciliation in Kosovo. 
 
3.4. Freedom of movement: mono-ethnic enclaves and ghettos 
 
 The lack of basic security for members of minority communities directly 
affected their ability to move freely on the whole territory of Kosovo. Without the 
escort of Kfor or UNMIK police they were facing a high risk of being attacked 
physically or verbally, beaten, or even killed, especially in the first two years after 
the war. This situation forced minorities into a self-imposed isolation in which they 
were avoiding majority Albanian populated areas, limiting their movement only to 
those parts of Kosovo where the members of their ethnicity were in either 
significant numbers or a majority. This lead to a creation of mono-ethnic territorial 
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pockets, so called enclaves, which were sometimes as large as few houses or 
streets.138 In some cases, in order to protect these enclaves from attacks, Kfor would 
fence them with barbed wire, turning them into WW2-like ghettos. The ethno-
territorial concentration was further boosted after the March 2004 riots, when 
smaller enclaves were destroyed in onslaughts of Albanian mobs and the population 
was forced to move to bigger ones.139 Eventually, it has been shown that minority 
communities have been able to keep their presence only in those parts of Kosovo 
where they were able to establish their enclaves. 
 This particularly applies to Serbs, which comprise almost all enclaves. 
There are six relatively larger Serbian enclaves, along with several dozens 
“pockets” of which some have no more than 80 people.140 
 The largest enclave is the Mitrovica region or North Kosovo. It consists of 
three municipalities – Leposavić, Zvečan, Zubin Potok – and the northern part of 
the city of Mitrovica, separated from the larger southern part by the Ibar River. The 
Mitrovica enclave population numbers around 50,000 people and deviates from 
others because it is directly connected to Serbia from northeast and northwest. The 
Mitrovica region is the only part of Kosovo that experienced minority population 
increase since 1999, as many Serbs and Roma relocated here from other areas. 
Almost the entire Serbian and Roma population of the southern Mitrovica, around 
4,500 people, moved across the river to the north during 1999 - 2000 and the March 
2004 riots.141 This enclave is practically multiethnic, with few Albanian-majority 
villages in the north and so-called Bošnjacka mahala, a mixed neighborhood, 
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inhabited by Albanians, Bosniaks and Serbs. Minority communities of the enclave 
enjoy relatively higher degree of security and are able to move more freely.142 
 Some 60 percent of Kosovo Serbs, around 70,000 people, live in enclaves 
south of the Ibar River, which are entirely surrounded by Albanian-majority areas. 
The southern most enclave is Štrpci, with a population of roughly 15,000. It is 
actually a multiethnic municipality, with two-thirds Serbian majority and Albanian 
minority. Both communities established their own institutions, i.e. the municipal 
government, schools, hospitals, and courts.143 
The largest Serbian enclave south of the Ibar River is Gračanica, some 10 
kilometers away from Priština, built around the medieval Serbian Orthodox 
monastery of the same name. The enclave has around 25,000 people of which 85 
percent are Serbs and 10 percent are Roma.144 The enclave was officially given the 
status of a municipality in 2008. Spreading some 10 kilometers in diameter, 
Gračanica transformed from a village into a focal point for Serbs from central 
Kosovo, harboring a hospital, schools, and other institutions providing public 
services. Many Serbs and Roma from Priština have found a refugee here after they 
were driven out from their homes. Gračanica is considered a safest Serb enclave in 
Kosovo, apart from the Mitrovica region.145 
Another significant enclave is in the Gnjilane municipality, which has the 
population of around 13,000.146 While Albanians overwhelmingly populate the city 
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of Gnjilane, Serbs are concentrated in dozen of villages in the municipality. The 
contact between two communities is virtually non-existent.147 
The enclave Lipljan located in the Priština region is the home to some 
10,000 Serbs, who live in six mono-ethnic and 13 ethnically mixed villages.148 The 
same is the size of the Kosovska Kamenica enclave in eastern Kosovo. From the 
part of this enclave, the new municipality Ranilug was created in 2008, 
encompassing some 5,000 Serbs and 1,000 Roma.149 
As already mentioned above, Serbs and other minorities are confined to free 
movement only within the enclaves, while the rest of Kosovo remains virtually 
inaccessible to them. This also refers to basic social services, such as health and 
schooling, since most of the enclaves are rural and do not poses sufficient 
infrastructure. Therefore, members of minority communities are often forced to 
travel from smaller to bigger enclaves to acquire medical treatment or to study. In 
addition, displaced members of minority communities, who moved to larger 
enclaves, somewhere in Serbia or elsewhere in the region, often visit their houses 
they fled or graveyards of their relatives. 
In order to improve communication between enclaves, UNMIK established 
the so-called Humanitarian Bus Transportation (HBT) service in 1999. HBT is the 
system of bus lines connecting Serbian enclaves, mainly smaller with bigger ones 
such as Mitrovica, Gračanica and Štrpce. In the beginning of international rule, 
these buses were operating only on scheduled days and were moving in convoys 
under the heavy-weapon Kfor escort. While passing through Albanian majority 
areas the buses were regularly thrown stones at. In some cases, they were attacked 
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by firearms, which resulted in fatalities. As of 2008, there were a total of 17 routs of 
HBT.150 
In 2007, management and funding of HBT was transferred from UNMIK to 
the provisional authorities; the Ministry of Transport and Communications and 
Ministry of Communities and Returns, in particular. The buses are now operating 
on almost daily basis and without military or police escort, though they are 
commonly exposed to stoning and verbal attacks by Albanian schoolchildren.151  As 
the number of users, security and quality of service are steadily rising over the 
years, HBT is scheduled to be fully entrusted to commercial bus companies from 
Serbian enclaves in Kosovo.152 
The HBT scheme is considered to be one of the successes of the 
international administration and the provisional authorities in improving the 
freedom of movement of minorities.153 However, it is questionable if a segregated 
bus transportation system, inability to freely access commercial means of 
transportation and to individually move on the whole territory of Kosovo without 
security concerns can be considered as a full exercise of freedom of movement as in 
others parts of Europe. 
 
3.5. Current security situation and freedom of movement 
 
 The period after the March 2004 riots saw a steady improvement of security and 
freedom of movement for minorities in Kosovo. The factors of increased pressure of the 
international community on the provisional authorities and the beginning of the final status 
negotiations contributed the most to these developments. Immediately after the riots, the 
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international community via the international administration put substantial pressure on the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership, clearly pointing out that Kosovo’s path toward self-
governance could be jeopardized and reversed if organized violence against minorities 
reoccurs. At the same time, the preparations for the final solution settlement were initiated, 
whose anticipation in the previous years is considered to be a generating factor of 
frustration among the Albanian majority and which was subsequently channeled through 
violence against minority communities.154 
 These trends were reflected by the situation on the ground. The rate of attacks on 
minority communities saw decline over the years. There were no major murders or 
beatings, thought these incidents did happen occasionally. The overall improvement of the 
security situation in the period was a result of increased capability of Kfor and UNMIK 
police to prevent violent attacks, increased efficiency and professionalism of the KPS, and 
physical separation of the Albanian and minority populations. 
 Currently, all minority communities in Kosovo enjoy a relatively high level of 
security, except for Serbs and Roma. These two communities are still subjected to violence 
by Kosovo Albanians. The forms of violence are attacks on returnees and their property, 
attacks on religious sites and graveyards, verbal attacks and other forms of harassment. In 
August 2009, an elderly Serbian couple was murdered in their home in Parteš, the Gnjilane 
region. Since there were no signs of robbery, the killing was probably ethnically 
motivated.155 In April 2010, Serb returnees in the village Žač, municipality Istok, were 
consecutively stoned for few nights. The 26 families set up tents near their destroyed 
houses, planning to rebuild them and move in again.156 In April 2011, a landmine was 
deactivated in a graveyard in the village Staro Gracko, the municipality of Lipljan. The 
landmine was probably planted there few days before Easter, when displaced Serbs from 
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the village annually visit graves of their late family members. The bodies of 14 Serb 
harvesters killed in 1999 are buried at this graveyard.157 
 These are only some of the anti-minority cases of violence that still occur on a daily 
basis throughout Kosovo. In the first eight months of 2009, there have been 275 inter-
ethnic incidents.158 Despite the fact that they are not nearly as deadly and brutal as those 
committed in the first five years of the international rule, they still pose security issues for 
Serbs and Roma and are hampering the process of return and freedom of movement. 
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4. DISPLACED, RETURN AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
 “All refugees and displaced persons who wish to return to Kosovo 
must be able to do so in safety and dignity” 
- Standards for Kosovo, IV. Sustainable Return and 
the Rights of Communities and their members 
 
“…the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: 
…Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of 
all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo” 
- Security Council Resolution 1244, Paragraph 11, Subparagraph (k) 
 
“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property” 
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 
 
 Expulsions, displacements and ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians were among 
the most important reasons for NATO to initiate a military campaign against Serbia. 
Therefore, the primary initial tasks of the international administration upon its installment 
in Kosovo was to establish secure environment and enable sustainable return of all 
displaced persons and refugees. Subsequently, the provisional authorities were also 
included in the process. 
 This chapter will examine the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons 
from minority communities and the process of their return to Kosovo after the war. It will 
look into the two crucial periods – the second half of 1999 and the March 2004 riots - when 
most of the displacements happened. Strategies and policies, institutional structure and 
concrete actions of both the international administration and the provisional authorities 
related to return and property rights will be described and evaluated. Finally, the problem 
of property rights, characteristic for Kosovo as being one of the major obstacles to effective 
return, will be analyzed as well. 
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4.1. Post-June 1999 and the March 2004 riots displacements 
 
 During the Kosovo conflict and especially during its last three months, when the 
intensity of violence was peaking, some 800,000 Albanians left their homes and became 
internally displaced, while around 500,000 went to cross-border refugee camps in Albania 
and Macedonia. After the hostilities ceased, almost all of them spontaneously returned to 
their homes over the course of a few weeks.159 
 As Albanians were pouring into Kosovo from Albania and Macedonia, Serbs and 
Roma were moving in the opposite direction – out of Kosovo. By October 1999, there were 
234,000 Serb and Roma IDPs from Kosovo in Serbia and Montenegro.160 While the initial 
wave of departures was prompted by concerns of possible retribution by the KLA, which 
was still effective on the ground, the second wave was caused by the surge in violent 
attacks committed by Kosovo Albanians as described in the previous chapter. It was an 
obvious widespread campaign of violence directed against minorities with a sole objective 
to force them out of a particular part or the whole territory of Kosovo.161 
 This meant that Kosovo was practically experiencing another ethnic cleansing, this 
time directed against Serbs and other minorities. During the period, most of urban areas 
and certain rural parts of Kosovo were completely cleansed of Serbs and Roma. Not 
counting the three northern predominantly Serb municipalities; there were 437 settlements 
inhabited by Serbs prior to June 1999 of which 312 have been completely ethnically 
cleansed.162 The capital Priština had a population of around 600,000 prior to the NATO 
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bombing of which 20,000 were Serbs. By the end of August 1999, fewer than 2,000 Serbs 
remained in the city.163 This number shrunk to a few dozen after the March 2004 riots. As 
of 2009, there are no Serbs in Kosovo’s capital. 
 The southern city of Prizren was completely cleansed of Serbs within a few weeks 
in the summer of 1999. The pre-war Serbian population of 10,000 was reduced to 254 in 
January 2000. These were mainly older Serbs who could not leave because they did not 
have any relatives or family in Serbia or elsewhere. They were predominantly confined to 
their houses and guarded by Kfor round the clock. The Bosniak population was also 
reduced from 38,500 in 1998 to 22,000 in March 2001.164 The number of Serbs in the 
municipality of Gnjilane dropped from 20,000 in 1998 to less over 12,000 in 2003. Almost 
the entire urban Serb population of the city of Gnjilane moved to Serb majority villages in 
the municipality. In the same period, the Roma population was reduced tenfold, from 3,560 
to 350.165 In the pre-war municipality of Đakovica there were around 3,000 Serbs, 
concentrated mainly in the urban municipality center. By the end of 1999, the town was 
emptied of Serbs.166 
 The most affected ethnic minority by the ethnic cleansing that occurred 
immediately after the arrival of the international administration were RAE communities. 
Out of the estimated pre-war population of 120,000 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, Kosovo 
Albanians expelled four fifths of them during the summer and autumn of 1999. This was 
described as “the single biggest catastrophe to befall the Romani community since World 
War 2.”167 Most of the displacements happened within the Serb-speaking Roma 
community. Albanian-speaking Ashkali and Egyptians who are socially better integrated in 
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predominantly Albanian populated areas were mainly spared, although did experienced a 
certain level of persecution as well and as a result had to leave their homes.168 
The particularly brutal case of displacement of Roma was the expulsion of the 
entire Roma community from the southern, Albanian-dominated part of Mitrovica. Roma 
lived there in a semi-autonomous enclave known as the Mahalla. Mahallas are a typical 
form of Roma existence in urban settlements, not only in Kosovo but also throughout the 
Balkans. They are usually areas on the outskirts of cities and towns, located on 
municipality-owned land or land of no clear ownership, excluded from municipal services 
and lacking basic infrastructure.169 Before the conflict, there were around 8,000 Roma 
living in the Mitrovica Mahalla, making it the single largest Roma settlement in whole of 
Kosovo. In the aftermath of the war, residents of the Roma district were constantly 
attacked, harassed and their homes were damaged or set on fire. The entire population of 
the Mahalla fled within few weeks, looking for security in the Serb-controlled part of the 
city north of the Ibar River. The Albanian crowds subsequently entered the Mahalla, 
looting, pillaging, and completely destroying over 750 houses.170 
Second wave of forceful expulsions and displacements of minorities occurred 
during the March 2004 riots. During the period of two days, 17-18 March, over 4,100 
Serbs, Roma and Ashkali were forced out of their homes. Over 550 minority homes, 10 
facilities providing social services and 27 Serbian Orthodox churches were burned or 
destroyed. While the March 2004 riots did not result in such a huge number of 
displacements as the post-June 1999 period, it is the most concentrated series of violent 
incidents with the clear intention of those who staged it to completely ethnically cleanse 
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certain areas of Kosovo populated by minority communities, which in most of the cases did 
happen.171 
 The target of attacks were primarily Serbian populated areas; enclaves and pockets 
in the urban settlements. Some of them were completely wiped out in onslaughts of 
Albanian mobs; the population forced to leave within few minutes. The worst affected 
minority settlement was the Serbian enclave Svinjare, located a few kilometers south of 
Mitrovica. All 137 Serb houses were burned to the ground and the entire population of 
around 500 was evacuated by Kfor without having enough time to collect even the most 
basic of possessions. The other example of total destruction and ethnic cleansing is Kosovo 
Polje, a town ten kilometers away from Priština. Unlike most of the other parts in Kosovo 
where minorities moved and isolated themselves in mono-ethnic enclaves, Serbs in Kosovo 
Polje where living alongside their Albanian neighbors. After the riots, the result was a 
complete destruction; all 600 Serbs were expelled, every single of 100 Serb houses was 
burned and destroyed, including the Orthodox church, post office and a hospital. Other 
major cities completely cleansed of Serbs included the capital Priština, where few dozens 
remaining Serb families living in one apartment building were barely evacuated on time 
and saved by Kfor, and western town Đakovica, where five remaining older Serbian 
women were first evacuated to a local Orthodox church and than had to be taken to Kfor’s 
military base because soldiers could not defend them from the mob.172 
 In regards to the other minority communities besides Serbs, the severely affected 
were Ashkali in the Vučitrn municipality. The community was numbering around 350 
families. During the riots almost all of them where expelled. Because of the involvement in 
butcher trade and remittances they receive from relatives working abroad, Ashkali in 
Vučitrn accumulated substantial wealth and built large houses. They were looted and over 
70 of them were set alight and destroyed.173 
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The major problem for Kosovo’s displaced minorities is the lack of appropriate 
housing, which, if it is present for a longer time, can lead to poverty and social exclusion. 
Most of the displaced settled in temporary-built shelters or containers but remained to live 
there for over a decade. These settlements are often erected on outskirts of cities, without 
appropriate infrastructure such as electricity, sewage or paved roads. Two minority IDP 
camp clusters in Kosovo exemplify severe hardships that people who are unable to return 
to their homes are experiencing – the Roma camps in the northern Mitrovica and the Serb 
camp in Štrpce. 
The Mitrovica Roma camp, which is comprised of the camps Česmin Lug and 
Osterode located next to each other, was established immediately after the war in Kosovo 
ended. The entire Roma population of 8,000 moved from the Mahalla in the southern 
Albanian-majority part of the city to mainly Serbian populated part in the north. As 
described earlier, the Mahalla was looted and entirely destroyed. The Roma camp in 
Mitrovica is located on the ground close to the largest industrial facility in Kosovo, the 
Trepča mine complex. The cluster of Trepča mines was established in 1926 and has been 
used for extraction of lead, zinc, cadmium, silver and gold. Field research in the 1970s and 
1980s showed very high levels of lead in the water, soil, and air in Mitrovica. However, 
Trepča continued to operate until the beginning of the war.174 
The camps Česmin Lug and Osterode have “the worst living conditions”175 where 
“the inhabitants live in small shacks made of wood, some of them isolated with cardboard 
lining”176, without running water. The blood tests of Roma children performed by Serbian 
and international doctors in 2002 showed the presence of unacceptably high levels of lead. 
The tests were afterwards also performed on adults and indicated that the whole Roma 
community in these two camps has been permanently poisoned by lead from the 
contaminated soil and water. The poisoning caused higher rate of kidney failures, high 
blood pressure, diabetes, rheumatism, asthma, and heart problems.177 In spite of the case 
                                                 
174 Human Rights Watch. “Poisoned by Lead. A Health and Human Rights Crisis in Mitrovica’s Roma 
Camps”. Human Rights Watch. New York. 23 June 2009. pp:22. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/node/83942 
175 Ibid. pp:40. 
176 Ibid. pp:40. 
177 Ibid. pp:41. 
 71
being highly publicized by international human rights watchdogs and some European 
institutions, around 1,000 Roma still continue to live in these two camps.178 
In the municipality of Štrpce there are over 700 displaced Serbs from mainly 
southern and western parts of Kosovo. The majority of them managed to accommodate 
either in socially owned weekend houses or with relatives. However, there are still 250 
persons living in five collective refugee centers. Living conditions in these centers are 
generally bad and under the acceptable level. It is a usual situation for eight families to 
share one bathroom. Overwhelming majority of the population is unemployed and the only 
income they have is social support benefits paid by Serbia.179 Dozens of similar collective 
centers, camps, and improvised residences across Kosovo and the region are hosting 
thousands of displaced Serbs, Roma, Ashkali and others who are waiting for over a decade 
to return to their homes. 
 
4.1.1. Reaction of Kfor and UNMIK 
 
 The initial reason for minorities to leave Kosovo in the aftermath of the war was the 
fear of the lack of security. Those who did not leave immediately, soon realized they have 
to do so as the fears of those who already left became reality. The most striking fact is that 
the international forces – Kfor and the UNMIK police – have not done anything or very 
little to prevent this massive outflow of the minority population by providing them with the 
minimal level of security. This applies to both the post-June 1999 and the March 2004 riots 
period. In the first case, the international forces did not show any decisive action to 
demonstrate that ethnic cleansing will not be tolerated. All they did was provide escorts for 
long queues of now-refugees leaving their homes and Kosovo or to protect those minority-
inhabited areas by establishing static checkpoints. It was clear that Kfor was geared to deal 
with external threats, i.e. possible invasion by Serbian forces, but not internal threats, such 
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as anti-minority violence and extensive ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, despite substantial 
evidence that former members of KLA were mostly responsible for the killings and 
expulsions of minorities, the international administration practically turned a blind eye and 
co-opted them into administrative and security structures of the provisional authorities.180 
The failure of the international security forces to protect minorities from another 
wave of ethnic cleansing during the March 2004 was even more visible when the near-
collapse of the security structure occurred. Kfor and the UNMIK police were once again, 
now barely on time, only able to unwillingly evacuate Serbs and other minorities from their 
homes, leaving their homes to be looted and destroyed in ablaze. As seen before, Kfor was 
not willing to respond with an appropriate force that would diminish or completely prevent 
results of the March anti-minority violence.181 
 
4.2. Process of return and return policies 
 
 As of 2010, there have been 224,000 refugees from Kosovo residing in the regional 
countries; in Serbia – over 205,000, in Montenegro – over 16,000, and in Macedonia – 
1,500.182 In addition, there are around 18,000 IDPs in Kosovo, of which 11,000 are 
members of minority communities.183 Considering that all refugees from Kosovo residing 
in the regional countries are non-Albanians, the number of minority communities members 
who currently do not live in the original place of their residence in Kosovo tops 235,000. 
Some 200,000 of them are Kosovo Serbs, with rest of it being Roma and Ashkali.184  
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Most of these displacements took place within the first year of international 
administration in Kosovo, when intensity of anti-minority violence was peaking. Due to the 
fact that the international community proclaimed safe and unobstructed return of all 
displaced persons to be the key goal of its mission in Kosovo and spent tens of millions of 
Euros trying to achieve this, one can claim that this has been fully achieved only in respect 
to displaced Kosovo Albanians. As of the minority communities, especially Kosovo Serbs, 
the return process statistics show that the over a decade-long process has been a complete 
failure. In the period 2000-2010, only 21,000 or eight percent of persons belonging to 
minority communities voluntarily returned to their homes from internal and external 
displacement within the region.185 The return rate is even worse for the largest minority 
community, Serbs, of which 200,000 fled Kosovo, only 8,656 or 4.3 percent voluntarily 
returned.186 The major reason for this situation is a “lack of employment and socio-
economic opportunities, limited access to public services, unresolved housing and property 
rights issues and, to some extent, security concerns and limited freedom of movement.”187 
The process of return, creation, and implementation of return policies in Kosovo 
were exclusive competences of the international administration in the early years of its 
presence on the ground. Kfor and to lesser extent the UNMIK police were to create the 
most important initial factor of return – a secure and safe environment. As seen from 
above, international forces drastically failed to do so. To make things grimmer, it was not 
only their inability to prevent major displacements and expulsions but also their occasional 
direct hampering and blocking of the return efforts of minorities. Instead of putting the core 
problem – anti-minority violence – under control, Kfor developed an approach trying to 
control the process of return, directly violating the right of displaced persons to return to 
their homes. 
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The most notorious case that credibly depicts this approach is a policy exercised by 
the German component of Kfor. In the period 2000-2001, in the southern and western parts 
of Kosovo, Kfor directly blocked the return process by claiming it cannot take place until a 
satisfactory level of security is achieved. The German Kfor often defined the return as 
being “premature”, which would most likely lead to disturbances. Instead of dealing with 
disturbances itself, Kfor established checkpoints around the Serb areas preventing anyone 
“unauthorized” of entering them. This also applied to Serbs who fled these areas but were 
willing and courageous enough to return. Their efforts were often blocked by Kfor 
administration, which did not want to issue passing permits.188 
The civilian administration in Kosovo, UNMIK, was involved in the process of 
return from the aspects of coordination, capacity building and funding. It started to shape 
the return systematically and structurally in 2002 by issuing a policy document titled the 
Rights to Sustainable Return. One year later, in order to turn the documented principles 
into practical procedures for planning and managing the return process, the Manual for 
Sustainable Return was developed. The Manual stipulated “international standards 
regarding the rights IDPs, the corresponding policy framework in Kosovo, the institutional 
roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders, and the operational procedures and 
mechanisms for managing the process of organized and individual minority return.”189 The 
success of UNMIK’s return policies was directly tied to those of Kfor’s. Without security 
for minorities and their subsequent steady return, there was no one that the policies could 
be applied to. That is why the creation of the first return strategy happened three years after 
the international administration was established and why the timing corresponds with the 
decrease of anti-minority violence. 
Simultaneously, UNMIK was developing and empowering local capacities to deal 
with the return. The provisional authorities got involved already in 2003, when they co-
authored the Manual in the role of an advisor. In 2004, the position of the Municipal Return 
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Officer was created and recruitments were taking place through a joint UNMIK-PISG 
procedure. The same year, the Municipal Strategy Returns Policy Paper was developed in 
order to specify procedures and instruments of return on a municipal level. In 2005, the 
Ministry of Communities and Return within the provisional government was established 
with the mandate to “monitor and support municipal efforts to address community issues 
and returns, including the work of Mediation Committees, Communities Committees, 
Municipal Community Offices, and the development and implementation of Municipal 
Returns Strategies.”190 Finally, in 2006, the Manual was updated and amended in order to 
address newly created institutional framework and to correct mistakes which were proved 
in practice.191 After the Kosovo unilateral declaration of independence, the return process 
was almost completely entrusted to the provisional authorities, with the international 
administration’s role downgraded to reporting, overseeing and consulting on the process. 
The return process reflected from the standpoint of provisional authorities showed 
big discrepancies between what has been proclaimed and what has been done in reality. 
While not lacking strategies, policies and legislation concerning the return of minorities, 
the provisional authorities showed incapable of implementing these on the ground. The 
main reasons for this was the lack of political will or commitment to return, the lack of 
financial resources, the lack of capacity for project implementation, and the lack of 
coordination between municipality and central levels of government. Currently, the 
provisional authorities support and advocate return only to the extent to which they are 
forced to do so. The situation is especially present where it influences return the most, on 
the municipal level, where chiefly only one person, the Municipal Return Officers, makes 
efforts concerning the issue. Another problem is that most municipalities do not have 
strictly defined funds within the budget aimed at supporting return. Even if money is 
allocated from the international administration funds or those from the central provisional 
government in Priština, the lack of transparency and responsibility by municipal authorities 
causes the funds for return to be redirected and spent to something else. Moreover, the 
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representatives of minority communities are very often misrepresented in municipal 
councils. This leads to the creation of return policies that do not answer needs of potential 
returnees, as there is no input into the process from their side. Overall, the provisional 
authorities did recognize the issue of minority return as a crucial one, but still have not 
done much to address it in the manner that will produce substantial positive results.192 
 
4.3. Property rights 
 
 Alongside with security, property rights are the most pressing problem blocking the 
return. Upon the establishment of the international administration and massive ethnic 
cleansing of minorities that ensued, a vast number of properties, including private, 
commercial and agricultural land, remained unprotected, and subsequently illegally seized 
and usurped.193 To address this problem, UNMIK established the Housing and Property 
Directorate (HPD) under its auspices. The HPD was tasked to receive and rule on requests 
about usurped properties; almost all requests were submitted by displaced minorities. In 
2006, UNMIK shut down the HPD and transferred its competences to the provisional 
authorities by creating the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA).194 
 The violation of property rights of minorities in Kosovo appears in three forms. The 
first one is illegal occupation of properties owned by members of minority communities. 
This mainly happens in the cities. The second form is destruction of homes owned by 
minorities, often followed by illegal construction on the site. Finally, attempts to drive 
minorities out of their homes and to gain ownership over them are often done through 
forced sales, which are achieved by constant harassments and intimidation.195 
                                                 
192 OSCE. “Municipal responses to displacement and returns in Kosovo”. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 
Department of Human Rights and Communities. November 2010. pp:19-22. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/73854  
193 Ibid. pp:22. 
194 Movement for Peace, PSIG, OSCE. “You are displaced, your rights are not. Conference on Sustainable 
Property Restitution and Solutions to Displacement in Kosovo During Transition, Final Conference 
Document and Recommendations”. 26-27 November 2007. Priština. pp:4. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/30782  
195 Baldwin, Clive. “Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule”. Minority Rights Group 
International. London. 2006. pp:18. Available at: http://www.minorityrights.org/1072/reports/minority-
rights-in-kosovo-under-international-rule.html 
 77
 While other minorities have more or less unrestricted access to their properties, the 
RAE and Serb communities face huge problems in doing so. This particularly refers to 
Roma whose attempts to repossess their properties are hampered by “the lack of adequate 
documentation, destruction during the conflict of documents proving ownership rights, the 
frequent malfunctioning of municipal cadastral offices, and overall misconception amongst 
the community about property rights.”196 For example, the problem is most acute in the 
Gnjilane region where only 10 percent of Roma enjoy their property rights, while rest of 
them are still waiting for the KPA and municipal courts to rule on their requests.197 
 The usurpation of Kosovo Serb properties is widespread in all areas south of the 
Ibar River, especially in those areas where no Serbs are left. There is no accurate data but it 
is certain that Kosovo Albanians currently illegally occupy thousands of Serb-owned 
houses and apartments. Additionally, over one million of cadastre units (arable land, 
pastures and forests) owned by Kosovo Serbs and worth over 50 USD billion are being 
usurped.198 
 Those whose property has been destroyed are experiencing the issue of slow or no 
reconstruction at all. Despite the fact that both the international administration and the 
provisional authorities are funding the reconstruction, these funds are either misused or 
insufficient. This was particularly present during the HPD existence when 10 percent of 
funds granted from UNMIK to municipalities were devoted to minority communities. 
However, in 2000 and 2001, minorities received only two and four percent of these funds, 
respectively.199 Another problem is that minorities who submit their requests asking for 
reconstruction often wait for years until their homes are rebuilt.200 
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 The minority communities, especially Serbs, are also experiencing one particularly 
complex problem that indirectly violates their property rights – forced sales. This issue is 
linked to security, where members of minority communities succumb to pressure to sell 
their home or land bellow the market price. The forced sales are happening under the 
established pattern: young Albanian men would visit a Serb house and politely offer to buy 
it. If their offer is refused, the house would be stoned repeatedly. They would then return 
with an even lower offer. If refused again, the intensity and frequency of harassment would 
be increasing until the house is sold. The number of forced sales is impossible to establish 
since neither the HPD, nor the KPA are classifying records based on inter-ethnic sales.201 
 The international administration until 2006 and the provisional authorities after this 
year did make efforts to resolve the issue of minorities’ property rights. However, they 
were rather unsuccessful. In the early years, even if the HPD would order an eviction from 
illegally occupied home, the Kfor and UNMIK police were reluctant to enforce the 
decision. This trend continued when the KPA took over and the KPS became in charge of 
evictions. Even if they would evict an illegal occupier, another one would soon move in 
since the legal owner resides somewhere else.202 In addition, another pressing issue is the 
extreme inefficiency of the KPA and local courts to deal with property rights claims 
requests. Out of 41,177 requests that were submitted by 2011, the decision has been 
reached in only 11,735 cases.203 
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5. CULTURAL RIGHTS 
 
“The Republic of Kosovo ensures the preservation and protection of its cultural and 
religious heritage” 
- The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 9 
 
“States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage 
conditions for the promotion of that identity” 
- Declaration on the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities, Article 1, Paragraph 1 
 
“The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to 
national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve 
the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, 
language, traditions and cultural heritage”. 
- Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Article 5 
 
 Cultural heritage, such as historic monuments, religious sites and language, have 
always been the defining elements of a particular ethnic or national group. In the case of 
minorities, they hold even greater significance. In a state, region or territory defined by the 
cultural characteristics of a majority group, minorities perceive their cultural features as an 
ultimate instrument of preservation of their distinctiveness and collective identity. The 
status of cultural heritage of one or more minority groups within a society is a good 
indicator for the quality of democracy, tolerance and human rights within that society. 
 This chapter will evaluate the rights of minority communities in regard to aspects of 
their cultural identity. In particular, the most pressing issues of preservation of historical 
and religious heritage, especially Serbian, and free use of language will be scrutinized. The 
component of minority cultural rights assessment will also be the role of the international 
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administration and the provisional authorities, their policies, strategies and actions in 
relation to Kosovo’s minority cultures. 
 
5.1. Destruction of Serbian religious heritage 
 
 The conflict in Kosovo contained a dispute over sovereignty and territory between 
Serbs and Albanians in its core. Both of the sides used the presence of their respective 
cultural symbols, i.e. historic and religious sites, to support righteousness of their claims. 
This combination of cultural and political aspects turned the destruction of cultural heritage 
in Kosovo into a constituent element rather than a side effect of the conflict. Therefore, this 
led to the Kosovo war being “a new form of conflict that is produced not out of geopolitical 
or ideological disputes, but out of the politics of particularistic identities.”204 
After the arrival of the international administration in Kosovo, minority cultural 
heritage was subjected to the systematic damaging and destruction. This was a particular 
case regarding Serbian religious heritage, which had a significant symbolic meaning for 
both Serbs and Albanians. Over 1,300 Serb Orthodox churches, monasteries and other 
religious sites in Kosovo are the crucial determinant of identity not only for Kosovo Serbs 
but also for all Serbs in general. For Albanians, these monuments represent symbols of the 
presence of the Serbian state, which they utterly refuse to be a part of.205 
Since June 1999 over 150 Serbian cultural monuments, churches and other religious 
landmarks have been destroyed in Kosovo. What makes the destruction a deliberate and 
organized campaign targeted to eliminate one minority community’s signs of presence is 
“the promotion of false historical data, undue claims to cultural heritage belonging to other 
peoples and the changing and renaming of geographical names and toponyms”.206 
The major destructions of Serbian cultural and religious landmarks occurred in two 
periods; in the second half of 1999 and first half of 2000, and during the March 2004 riots. 
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In the aftermath of the war, as Serbs began leaving Kosovo, many churches remained 
unprotected and became an object of retribution by the Albanian population. This was the 
case especially in urban areas. Desecration would happen by a pattern: churches would be 
first robbed, then vandalized and then burned or razed to the ground. It is estimated that 
over 100 churches and other religious landmarks were either heavily damaged or destroyed 
during the first year and a half of international presence in Kosovo.207 
The current situation for Serb Orthodox religious sites is relatively good. Since Kfor 
and KPS increased security measures around churches and monasteries after the March 
2004 riots, there have been no major destructions. However, Serb religious heritage is still 
regularly subjected to thefts, stoning and partial damaging, especially in areas where there 
is no Serb population.208 Additionally, a bizarre trend of desecration of Serb graves never 
ceased.209 One of the biggest Serbian cemeteries in Kosovo located in southern Mitrovica 
has no undamaged tombstones. All of them are either partially damaged or completely 
destroyed. The efforts of families to rebuild them are in vain, as they end up being 
destroyed again only a few days after the reconstruction. In some cases, vandals go even 
further by digging out coffins, leaving the skeletons and bodies to be devoured by wild 
animals.210 On 18 February 2010, a Kosovo Serb elderly woman was buried in the Serbian 
Orthodox cemetery in Gnjilane, for the first time since 1999. The next morning the grave 
was desecrated, the coffin dug up and severely damaged.211 
Other minority communities do not face significant destruction or damaging of their 
cultural and religious heritage. Since all of them are nominally Muslims, as is almost the 
whole Albanian population of Kosovo, their religious and cultural sites, consisting mainly 
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of mosques, were never the targets of attacks. Except for the Roma community, all others 
freely share religious facilities with the majority population.212 
 
5.1.1. The March 2004 riots destruction 
 
During only two days of the March 2004 riots, Serbian cultural and religious 
heritage experienced the most concentrated and most intensive destruction. Out of roughly 
155 churches and monasteries that were partially or completely destroyed in the past 12 
years, 35 of them faced a similar destiny over the course of 48 hours in March 2004. Apart 
from the goal to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of minorities, Serbs and Roma in the first place, 
50,000-plus rioters delivered its destructive force upon religious and cultural objects of the 
Serbian community. It is clear that their aim was also to destroy any traces and symbols of 
historical and contemporary presence of Serbs in Kosovo. Therefore, they purposely 
targeted sites of the greatest historical, religious and artistic value.213 
The most valuable Serb religious site destroyed in the March 2004 riots was the 
Church of the Virgin of Ljeviš in Prizren. The church was built in the early 14th century and 
has been listed on the UNESCO list of world heritage since 2004. The rioting mob on 17 
March looted the church first, desecrated frescos, and than set it ablaze. The fire completely 
destroyed everything inside the church, including centuries-old religious artifacts and wall 
paintings. Besides this one, 16 others churches and monasteries listed as first-class cultural 
monuments by Serbia were also looted and burned to the ground.214 
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5.2. Responses of the international administration and PISG 
 
 Responses of the international administration to the destruction of Serbian cultural 
heritage have been idle and ineffective. In the initial period, during the first two years after 
the war, Kfor’s policy was the deployment of troops around major religious and cultural 
sites. This strategy did help to prevent potential destruction, but at the same time hundreds 
of other churches, monasteries and monuments were left completely unprotected and 
therefore doomed to be destroyed or damaged. The unwillingness of Kfor to act was 
especially surprising in relation to those towns and villages that were completely emptied 
of Serbs and where probable destruction of cultural and religious heritage was certain to 
happen. After the looting and burning of a particular church or monastery would take place, 
Kfor forces would surround rubbles with barbed wire to prevent further destruction, if that 
was even possible anymore. Within two years upon the arrival of the international forces, 
Kosovo was dappled with piles of bricks and concrete, surrounded with barbed wire, where 
once centuries-old sacral monuments of the Christian Orthodox civilization used to 
stand.215 
 The failure to protect Serbian cultural heritage was complete during the March 2004 
riots. Kfor soldiers or the KPS, which was also in charge of security at the time, were 
unable to protect 34 churches and monasteries from complete destruction. The failure was 
most visible in the German sector of responsibility, where all the religious sites under their 
protection were set alight. The only appropriate response came from Kfor’s Italian soldiers 
who were able to defend monasteries of Dečani and Peć Patriarchy, another two 
monuments on the UNESCO world heritage list, in spite of constant attacks of massive 
Albanian rioting mobs.216 
 Only after the March 2004 riots did the international administration decide to 
actively engage in the protection and reconstruction of the Serb community cultural and 
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religious heritage. Their first move was to ensure security around the sites, which was 
achieved by the increasing of Kfor troops and a more proactive engagement of the KPS. 
After this, UNMIK obliged a few of the provisional authorities’ institutions, such as the 
Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports, the Kosovo Institute for the Protection of 
Monuments and the Kosovo Council for Cultural Heritage, to make the reconstruction of 
Serbian religious heritage their to priorities. UNMIK also invited UNESCO, the European 
Commission and the Council of Europe to assist in assessing the damage that Serb 
churches and monasteries sustained in March 2004. Subsequently, the representatives of 
the provisional authorities, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and Belgrade-affiliated experts 
were included in the process, which resulted in the production of three technical assessment 
reports on the reconstruction of 34 Serbian churches and monasteries. The provisional 
authorities and UNMIK pledged around 3.7 USD million and 0.5 USD million, 
respectively, for the first phase of reconstruction, which started in 2005. In the same year, 
the Reconstruction Implementation Commission for Serbian Orthodox Religious Sites in 
Kosovo was formed with tasks to coordinate and supervise the reconstruction of the 
churches and monasteries.217 Up until 2010, almost two-thirds of reconstruction works 
have been finished. Over 8 USD million was spent, funded mainly by the provisional 
authorities and the international administration.218 
                                                
 In accordance with the international administration’s policy of the transfer of 
responsibilities to the provisional authorities, Kfor started to hand over the security of 
Serbian churches and monasteries to the KPS. In August 2010, the KPS became 
responsible for security of four monasteries, including the monastery Gračanica in central 
Kosovo. The move was not welcomed by the Serbian Orthodox Church, which claimed that 
this would worsen the security conditions for the clergy and monastery itself.219 Few 
months earlier, in March, the KPS also took over the responsibility to protect the 
Gazimestan, a monument complex erected on the place where the epic battle between 
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Serbian and Ottoman armies took place in 1389. This event was also followed by the 
security concerns of the Serb community representatives, which openly expressed their 
doubts concerning the KPS’s sincerity and ability to protect one of the most important 
Serbian monuments. Kfor still remains responsible for the protection of four Serbian 
monasteries, two of which are on the UNESCO list of world heritage.220 
 Despite the fact that both the international administration and the provisional 
authorities improved the security situation and reconstructed major monuments of Serbian 
culture, the heritage of this minority community is still being attacked by more 
sophisticated means. The municipal authorities throughout Kosovo very often issue permits 
for construction on illegally occupied church land or special protective zones around 
churches and monasteries.221 The exemplary case is the construction of a park in the center 
of Đakovica, where once the church of Holy Trinity stood. The church was razed in 1999, 
rubbles cleared few years later, and in 2008 its foundations were buried with a one meter-
thick layer of earth. On top of it, a new park funded by the municipality budget was built in 
the same year, leaving no traces of the church’s existence.222 
 Another issue is that the international administration and the provisional authorities 
focused their attention exclusively on the reconstruction and preservation of 34 churches 
and monasteries destroyed in the March 2004 riots. Hundreds of others that were destroyed 
or partially damaged before and after these events remained unprotected and are facing 
slow disappearance under the influence of weather conditions and vandals. 
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5.3. Use of minority languages 
 
 The official languages of Kosovo are Albanian and Serbian, while Turkish, Bosnian 
and Roma languages have the status of official languages at the municipal level.223 In 
reality, the languages of minority communities are heavily underrepresented in public life 
for two major reasons: security concerns and institutional segregation. 
 Members of minority communities avoid speaking their native language in majority 
Albanian areas out of fear they could be physically or verbally harassed. This problem was 
particularly present during the early years of the international administration when 
speaking in some of the minority languages, especially Serbian, could even lead to being 
killed. In summer of 1999, few weeks after the deployment of first contingent of 
international mission, a Bulgarian-national UNMIK staff member was killed in broad 
daylight on streets of Priština. Since both Serbian and Bulgarian are South-Slavic 
languages and sound similar to non-native speakers, the killers, ethnic Albanians, thought 
that a Bulgarian, whom they heard speaking, was actually a Serb.224 Over the years, the 
situation improved and Serbs are now free to speak their language in most of urban areas 
but occasionally confront verbal abuse by Albanians. Situation in rural areas is much 
different and Serbs and other minorities use Albanian language if they are able to speak 
it.225 
 While speaking a minority language does not pose a security risk anymore in most 
of today’s Kosovo, the form of direct language segregation within Kosovo’s provisional 
institutions is widespread and systematic. Serbian language, as the second official 
language, is heavily underrepresented in official communication. Many institutions do not 
translate their official documents into Serbian and if so, the quality of translation is very 
poor. The employees of public institutions often require to be addressed only in Albanian 
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and respond only in Albanian. Official web pages of the provisional authorities in a very 
few cases have their complete content translated into Serbian, while for other minority 
languages almost never. Topographical road signs are in most of the cases bi-lingual, but 
Serbian name is often scratched over or peeled off.226 The provisional authorities adopted 
the Law on languages in 2006, committing themselves to ensure equal representation and 
use of official languages. However, the minority communities are still not completely able 
to freely use their native languages in public or to communicate with public institutions and 
receive services from them in one of the non-Albanian languages without any obstacles.227      
 
                                                 
226 OSCE. “Kosovo Communities Profiles”. OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 2010. pp:260-262. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/75450 
227 OSCE. “Implementation of the Law on the Use of Languages by Kosovo Municipalities”. OSCE Mission 
in Kosovo, Monitoring Department. June 2008. Available at: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/32762 
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6. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
 
“Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment” 
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23 (1) 
 
“Communities and their members shall have right to: 
…Enjoy equal opportunity with respect to employment in public bodies at all levels and 
with respect to access to public services at all levels; … 
…Receive and provide public health and social services, on a nondiscriminatory basis, in 
accordance with applicable standards; …” 
- Constitutional Framework, Chapter 4, Paragraph 4.4 
 
 The right to work and the right to the free access to social services, such as health 
and education, are often excluded from the list of basic human rights. However, as the 
meaning and interpretations of human rights are constantly widening, the rights to have 
employment and social security have become a vital part of what is referred to as second 
generation rights.228 Social and economic rights are particularly important for the 
assessment of minority human rights because they are a good indicator of the levels of 
inclusion or exclusion of a minority group within the society. 
 This chapter will examine the quality of these rights in the case of Kosovo. It will 
look into the basic structure, and indicators of Kosovo’s economic and social services 
systems. Areas of living standard, employment rate, accessibility to basic social services, 
and social coverage of minority communities will be examined in order to show to what 
extent these parameters are directly tied to the level of respect for basic human rights. 
Finally, it will describe the issue of quality and accessibility of the education system for 
children from minority communities.   
 
                                                 
228 Sen, Amartya. “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights”. Blackwell Publishing Inc. Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 32, No.4. 2004. pp:316. Available at: http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/asenETHR.pdf 
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6.1. Overview of the Kosovo economy 
 
 Kosovo is one of the poorest regions in Europe with the GDP per capita equaling 
3,240 USD.229 The unemployment rate is hard to evaluate because of the lack of census 
data and a huge shadow economy, but it is estimated to be between 40 and 60 percent, the 
highest in Europe.230 Kosovo’s population is the poorest in Europe, with 45 percent living 
in poverty and 18 percent in extreme poverty.231 In the period 1999-2009 Kosovo’s annual 
GDP growth was 4 percent.232 
 Kosovo’s current economic status is a result of decades-long stagnation and poor 
performance. During the time of former Yugoslavia, Kosovo was receiving significant 
development subsidies from a federal fund financed by all republics as being the country’s 
poorest region. The economic stagnation of Yugoslavia in the 1980s, followed by the break 
up of the country, international sanctions and wars in the 1990s, additionally deteriorated 
Kosovo’s economy. The Kosovo War and NATO bombardment practically killed the 
economy by destroying the few remaining vital companies. Under the international 
administration, the international community has been extensively helping Kosovo’s 
recovery.233 
 Today, Kosovo is still heavily dependant on the financial aid from abroad. 
Remittances from the diasporas, mainly in Switzerland, Germany and the Nordic countries, 
account for 13-15 percent of GDP, while donor-financed activities for another seven 
percent. With international assistance, Kosovo privatized over 90 percent in value of public 
                                                 
229 World Bank. “World Bank Data by Country”. 2009. Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/kosovo 
230 CIA. “The Worl Factbook: Economy – Kosovo”. 20 April 2011. Available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html 
231 World Bank. “Kosovo Povert Assesment. Volume II: Estimating Trends from Non-comparable Data”. 
Report No.39737-XK. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region. 
3 October 2007. pp:7. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKOSOVO/Country%20Home/21541688/KosovoPAvol2.pdf 
232 World Bank. “Kosovo – Country Brief  2010”. October 2010. Available at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/KOSOVOEXTN/0,,contentMDK:
20629286~menuPK:297777~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:297770,00.html  
233 World Bank. “Kosovo”. Available at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/KOSOVOEXTN/0,,menuPK:2977
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companies. Kosovo is rich in minerals – lignite, zinc, nickel, aluminum – which were the 
backbone of it industry, but output drastically plunged due to ageing equipment and the 
lack of investment. Bad communication infrastructure, limited and unreliable electricity 
supply, widespread corruption, weak institutions and unresolved political status are the 
major obstacles of Kosovo’s economic development.234 
 The dire economic situation directly influences the social one. People of Kosovo are 
falling behind the health and education standards of their European neighbors. Human 
Development Index, the measurement of progress and quality of life, is the lowest in the 
region. The under-five child mortality rate is 35-40 per 1,000 live births, being the highest 
in Europe. The life expectancy is 69 years, among the lowest in Europe. The social 
protection system reaches only 25 percent of the poor. Only 10 percent of the children with 
disabilities are enrolled in school.235 Overall, the extreme poverty and bad social conditions 
are among few rare things that connect all ethnic communities in Kosovo. 
 
6.2. Economic status of minority communities 
 
 The underdeveloped economy, combined with security issues, segregation and 
limited freedom of movement, makes the socio-economic situation of minority 
communities even worse than Kosovo’s average. The basic economic parameters for non-
Albanians, such as the employment rate and average salary, are lower than in the case of 
Kosovo Albanians. In exercising their right to work, members of minority communities are 
subjected to both indirect discrimination, i.e. the inability to travel to workplaces, as well as 
direct discrimination, based on their ethnicity, language and/or religion. The situation is 
additionally worsened in minority enclaves, which in some cases do not possess basic 
infrastructure and resources for any kind of economic activity.236 
                                                 
234 CIA. “The Worl Factbook: Economy – Kosovo”. 20 April 2011. Available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html 
235 UNDP. “Kosovo Human Development Report 2010”. UNDP in Kosovo. Available at: 
http://www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/HDR-2010-English.pdf 
236 Amnesty International, “Prisoners in our Own Homes: Amnesty International’s concerns for the human 
rights in Kosovo/Kosova”. pp:36. April 2003. Available at: 
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 The Roma community is experiencing the worst economic situation in Kosovo, 
which is close to that in least developed countries. The unemployment rate of Roma male 
youth aged 15 – 24 is 75 percent.237 Very few Roma are employed in public service, 
despite the quotas for minorities prescribed by law. Because of some specific cultural 
characteristics, such as early marriages and high dropout rates from school, Roma are 
generally are a less competitive work force, with fewer qualifications and skills. This trend 
is particularly present in the case of Roma women, as only few are actively engaged in 
formal labor market. Common types of employment for Kosovo Roma are collecting scrap 
metal or low paid cleaning activities.238 
 The economic status of the Gorani is relatively good. Traditionally known as good 
bakers, their main source of income are family-run businesses such as confectionaries or 
fast food shops. A significant portion of income is also generated from agricultural 
activities, livestock or beekeeping predominantly. Since many Goranis moved out of 
Kosovo prior to and especially after the war, remittances from aboard comprise another 
significant share of incomes.239 
 The economic situation within the Serb community varies according to a region. In 
the enclaves south of the Ibar River economic parameters are extremely bleak. The 
unemployment rate is nearly 90 percent, while the average monthly salary is 100 Euros and 
average monthly pension just below 40 Euros. Therefore, an overwhelming majority of 
Kosovo Serbs is dependent on subsidies from Serbia, the so called the Kosovo supplement, 
or on salaries they receive directly from Serbia’s budget as public sector employees. Over 
the course of the past few years, more and more Serbs are willing to work in the public 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/010/2003/en/4172c5e4-d702-11dd-b0cc-
1f0860013475/eur700102003en.pdf 
237 Amnesty International, “Prisoners in our Own Homes: Amnesty International’s concerns for the human 
rights in Kosovo/Kosova”, pp:10. April 2003. pp:19. Available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/010/2003/en/4172c5e4-d702-11dd-b0cc-
1f0860013475/eur700102003en.pdf 
238 OSCE. “Kosovo Communities Profiles”. OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 2010. pp:190. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/75450 
239 Ibid. pp:150. 
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sector provided by the provisional institutions, especially in the KPS and municipal 
administration.240 
In the Mitrovica region, situation is somehow different. The average monthly salary 
is around 250 Euros. However, the private sector generates only 15 percent of the income 
of the local community. The biggest employer is the state of Serbia, whose institutions are 
fully present in the region and runs all the public services. Small portions of those 
employed are working for the international administration, usually as translators and 
drivers, or other international organizations.241 
 In spite of the high unemployment, Kosovo Serbs are in a better position compared 
to other communities. Combined incomes from Belgrade’s and the provisional institutions’ 
subsidies and international donations in the form of pensions, social welfare put their living 
standard above the average of other minority communities.242 
 
6.3. Access to health services 
 
 Generally, the Kosovo healthcare system is in a very bad condition. Despite the 
substantial investments by the international community after the war, the sector remains 
poorly developed. It is characterized by low quality services, corrupt medical staff, lack of 
essential pharmaceuticals, poor hygiene standards, and poor working conditions and 
salaries.243 The government expenditures on healthcare are only three percent of GDP, far 
less than the regional seven percent average.244 In addition, there are two health care 
systems in Kosovo that operate separately; one funded by the international administration 
and provisional authorities and another by Serbia present only in areas with Serbian 
                                                 
240 Kostovicova, Denisa. “European Zones of Human Security: A Proposal for the European Union”. Center 
for the Study of Global Governance. February 2007. pp:7. Available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/archived/global/Publications/HumanSecurityZonesPaper.pdf 
241 UNMIK. “A Post-Industrial Future? Economy and Society in Mitrovica and Zvečan”. European Stability 
Initiative. Available at: http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_61.pdf 
242 OSCE. “Kosovo Communities Profiles”. OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 2010. pp:231. Available at: 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/75450  
243 Terdevci, Fatmire. “Report on Kosovo’s Healthcare System”. BIRN. Priština. November 2009. Available 
at: http://www.kosovo.birn.eu.com/attachment/000000792.pdf?g_download=1 
244 UNDP. “Kosovo Human Development Report 2010”. UNDP in Kosovo. 2010. pp:70. Available at: 
http://www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/HDR-2010-English.pdf 
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majority. Except for a few cases, Serbs do not use services of medical facilities in Albanian 
areas and vice versa.245 
 Obtaining even basic medical services in such a low-quality system for minority 
communities is often practically impossible. As in the case of employment, the most 
affected community are the Roma. Two major reasons why Roma are unable to access 
Kosovo’s healthcare system is the lack of healthcare insurance and ethnic segregation. 
Since only a small portion of Roma have formal employment, their ability to acquire health 
insurance is very limited. Another problem is that Albanian doctors occasionally refuse to 
treat Roma or do so only if they are forced by Kfor soldiers or other international staff. 
Since Kosovo’s health system is rigged by corruption, patients give money to doctors in the 
pay-out-of-pocket manner as a condition to receive medical attention. Consequently, Roma 
often do not go to hospitals knowing that without money they will not be taken care of. 246 
Even if Roma do have access to health centers in Albanian majority areas, they often opt 
for receiving treatment in Serb-dominated areas because of fears of being ill-treated. In 
Gnjilane, for example, despite the fact that there is a hospital only 150 meters away from 
their neighborhood, Roma go to a smaller and less equipped medical center in the Serb 
enclave, which is six kilometers away.247    
On the other hand, the health condition of the Roma community members is 
additionally worsened by the poor living conditions. They primarily reside in enclaves and 
ghettos, in improvised housing such as tents or abandoned and ruined houses, where 
sanitary conditions are extremely bad. This situation especially affects children. In the 
already mentioned Roma camp in Mitrovica, where the massive poisoning by lead is 
                                                 
245 Bllom, J.D., et al. “Ethnic segregation is Kosovo’s post-war health care system”. European Journal of 
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recorded, a Roma child “will be the least healthy, the least nourished and have the least 
access to health care of all Kosovo children.”248 
Serbs are in the best situation compared to other minorities, when it comes to 
healthcare system accessibility. Their medical insurance is paid by Serbia and they receive 
medical treatments in Serbia-funded medical facilities. In the Mitrovica region, there are 
1,460 employees in healthcare, which is more than enough to service the population of 
around 50,000. There is also a central hospital in North Mitrovica, with local medical 
centers in Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić.249 However, Serbs who live south of the 
Ibar River are in a notably worse situation. The larger enclaves, like Gračanica and Štrpce, 
have hospital-like medical centers, whereas smaller ones rarely do. Serbs from these areas 
are forced to travel to Gračanica, Štrpce or the Mitrovica region. In the Gnjilane enclave, 
Serbs rather go to the hospital in Bujanovac, in southern Serbia, which is 30 kilometers 
away than to the local hospital in their town. In cases of emergency, when life is directly 
endangered, Serbs or other minorities ask for treatment in the provisional authorities-run 
hospitals or medical centers only if Kfor escorts them.250 
 
6.4. Access to education 
 
 Literacy and the level of education are directly tied with one’s social status and 
quality of life as well as with development prospects of a society as the whole. This rule 
particularly applies to Kosovo. About 67 percent of the population with higher education is 
employed, in contrast to only 14 percent of those without formal education.251 
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 The situation in the education system is the same as in the respect to health care. In 
majority Albanian areas students are studying according to curriculum created by the 
provisional authorities, while in the Serb areas the curriculum is that of Serbia. While the 
enrollment of Kosovo Albanian and Serb children in primary schools is almost full, it is 
only 77 percent in children aged 7-14 among other communities (Roma, Askhali, 
Egyptians, Bosniaks and Gorani). The percentage is lower for girls in these communities 
and stands at 69 percent.252 
 As in all other social aspects, Roma are experiencing the greatest exclusion from 
the education system of all minorities. It is hard to keep accurate records of the number of 
Roma kids enrolled in primary education, because of the constant dropouts and stay-outs. 
Generally, the rate of Roma attending primary education is unacceptably low and is 
estimated to be below 50 percent. For example, in the municipality of Gnjilane there are 
over 1,160 Roma families where none of the children from these families go to school. A 
big issue for Roma children that blocks their access to the education system is the language 
barrier. Many of them do not speak either of the two official languages, Albanian or 
Serbian, which is one of the reasons for the high dropout rate. Although laws stipulate that 
members of all ethnic communities should be able to gain education in their mother tongue, 
no substantial capacities to enforce this measure have been developed yet.253 
 In general, Kosovo Serb children do not face difficulties in accessing the education 
system in Kosovo provided by Serbia. Serbian-curriculum schools are in a relatively good 
condition; school transportation is provided and funded by Serbian government and with 
the exception of Roma pupils the dropout rate is very low.254 However, the major problem 
for Serb students is the access to secondary education. The only Serb-curriculum university 
in Kosovo is located in the northern Mitrovica, so the students south of the Ibar River are 
forced to travel or to find accommodation in the town which financially burdens their 
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parents. Because of this, many families simply decide to move from Kosovo to Serbia, 
looking for better education, higher security and better employment prospects for their 
kids.255 
 The Gorani community is experiencing problems in accessing education in Serbian 
language. In 2009, most of Gorani teachers decided to remain loyal to the Serbian 
curriculum. As a response, local administration controlled by Albanians denied teachers the 
right to conduct teaching in local school facilities unless they accept Albanian-language 
curriculum by the provisional authorities. The issue was resolved by the mediation of 
international administration and most of Gorani children now again attend schools with the 
language of instruction being Serbian. Still, some children are forced to travel over 20 
kilometers a day because there is not enough school facilities or teachers in the place of 
their residence. Other minorities, such as Turks and Bosniaks, do not experience any major 
obstacles to access the education system. Turks are well integrated into the majority 
Albanian society and their children attend Albanian-curriculum schools. In some of them, 
they are able to gain primary education in the Turkish language. Bosniaks also mainly 
choose to send their children in Albanian-language schools. Their major concern is the lack 
of textbooks in the Bosniak language.256 
 In sum, almost all children in Kosovo do have a chance to acquire education, at 
least on the primary level. However, the education system faithfully reflects the deeply 
divided society. In contemporary Kosovo not a single school, faculty or university provides 
education in both Serbian and Albanian languages. These two languages are official in 
Kosovo and, nominally, they should be equally represented in all public institutions, 
including schools. The result of this will be that young generations will not be able to 
communicate or understand each other, which will only strengthened divisions and mistrust 
between ethnic communities.257 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis is set out to examine key developments in the area of minority human 
rights in Kosovo in the period following the military intervention of NATO to present day. 
In regard to this, the foremost questions the thesis targeted to investigate are: What has 
been the overall security situation for minority communities in Kosovo; to which extent do 
they enjoy unlimited freedom of movement on the whole territory of Kosovo; what is the 
current situation of internally displaced persons and refugees belonging to minority 
communities; what are the major trends in the process of return and to which extent it has 
been successful; what are the major issues related to property rights of minorities, as a 
distinctive problem that aroused in post-war Kosovo, and are these rights respected 
sufficientlly; what are the crucial distinguishing constituents of minority cultural rights in 
Kosovo and how are they reflected by the situation on the ground; and what is the general 
socio-economic position of minority communities within the Kosovo society. 
 Simultaneously, the thesis aimed to find answers to another set of questions 
concerning the international presence on the ground and subsequently developed local 
structures of Kosovo’s limited self-government: What is the scope of influence of the 
international administration and the provisional authorities on minority human rights in 
Kosovo and, particularly, to the areas chosen to be investigated above; what are the 
policies, instruments and responses of the international administration and the provisional 
authorities in addressing the issues of minority human rights; and how successful were they 
in promoting, protecting and implementing human rights of minority communities in 
Kosovo. 
 The summarized findings of the analysis show that human rights of minorities in 
Kosovo are far from being respected even up to the least satisfying and acceptable level. 
The security situation for the minorities has been dire throughout the whole period of 
international presence in Kosovo. Particularly dreadful were the first three years when over 
1,000 people were murdered only because they belonged to one of the non-Albanian 
communities. Apart from killings, minorities were subjected to intensive campaign of 
abductions, beatings, and other forms of physical and verbal harassments. The yet-to-start 
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investigation into the case of organ harvesting of abducted and arbitrary imprisoned Serbs 
during the second half of 1999 and 2000, should reveal what were the extreme forms of 
human rights violations that Kosovo’s minorities were enduring during the period. Over the 
course of years the security situation was steadily improving, with another backdrop during 
the March 2004 riots, and reached the current level that could be described as stabile but 
fragile. The increased level of security could be partially prescribed to the fact that the 
majority Albanian community and minority communities are physically separated and 
virtually do not interact due to the trend of enclavisation and ghettoisation. The group 
existence of Serbs and Roma in present-day Kosovo assumed the form of mono-ethnic 
enclaves, ghettos and “pockets”, with the freedom of movement confined within them. 
 Due to the brutal and intensive campaign of violence in the early years of 
international administration, Kosovo saw a major outflow of minorities. More than half of 
the Kosovo pre-war minority population, around 300,000, fled to Serbia, neighboring 
countries or elsewhere. To date, only eight percent or 21,000 returned. One of the greatest 
obstacles for return, besides security and harsh economic conditions, is the massive and 
systematic usurpation and illegal seizure of minorities’ property by the Albanian 
population. 
 The respect for cultural rights is below the acceptable standards. Members of the 
minority communities are still far from being free to speak their language, profess their 
religion or display their ethnic symbols. In addition, the religious and cultural heritage of 
the Serbian community, churches and monasteries foremost, was subjected to systematic 
destruction and annihilation. Some of these centuries-old monuments have high artistic, 
religious and historic value and are the part of the humanity’s heritage. 
 Lacking security and with limited freedom of movement, minority communities are 
in severe socio-economic situation within already impoverished Kosovo. The 
unemployment rate for minorities tops 90 percent, while Roma face almost full 
unemployment. The Roma and Serb refugee camps in Kosovo are the examples of ultimate 
human misery where people are exposed to extreme poverty, social exclusion and even 
industrial poisoning. Many members of minority communities, Roma especially, are not 
able to obtain medical services, social insurance and primary education for their children. 
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 The response of the international administration and the provisional authorities in 
relation to all these human rights issues of minority communities has been rather bleak and 
ineffective. The main reason for it is a huge discrepancy between what has been proclaimed 
on the paper and what has been achieved on the ground. The international community did 
not lack policies, strategies, and plans for the improvement of overall situation of minority 
communities. The failure was their implementation on the ground. Additionally, the 
development of the provisional authorities and insertion of more international presence, for 
example through Eulex, created a complicated governing structure with overlapping 
competences and unclear duties and responsibilities. UNMIK and Kfor were not able to 
provide members of minority communities with the necessary minimum level of security. 
They were also unable to protect the property and belongings of those who fled Kosovo. 
Lootings, burnings, destruction and unlawful seizure of houses and land became 
widespread and uncontrolled, while UNMIK and Kfor were just idle bystanders. The same 
happened to religious and cultural heritage of non-Albanian communities, especially 
Serbian, which was targeted because of its important symbolic meaning. 
Besides its role to rule Kosovo, the international administration was gradually 
developing local structure of government. The provisional authorities saw the increase in 
competences and responsibilities over time, including those related to minority 
communities. Unfortunately, their failure was even more abysmal. Mainly composed of 
Kosovo Albanians, the provisional authorities incorporated many of those who were 
responsible for crimes against minorities during the war and its aftermath. Combined with 
open intolerance of Albanians toward other ethnicities, these institutions turned out to be 
segregationist instruments in hands of the majority population. Furthermore, Albanian 
extremist easily used the provisional institutions and public-owned media to facilitate 
spread of hatred and violence toward Serbs and Roma, as it was the case in the eve and 
during the March 2004 riots. 
The major success of both the international community and the provisional 
authorities is the reconstruction of Serbian churches and monasteries destroyed during the 
March 2004 riots. Another one is the Humanitarian Bus Transportation scheme that 
improves mobility of minorities between isolated enclaves. The increased security situation 
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is partially a result of increased efficiency of Kfor and the KPS and can be defined as one 
of the achievements. 
Nevertheless, these minor improvements are not sufficient to reverse the effects of 
ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of the war, enclavisation of minority-populated areas, 
deeply rooted intolerance in Albanian community toward Serbs and Roma, and steady 
outflow and decrease of minority population in contrast to virtually halted return process. 
Contemporary Kosovo is an exclusively Albanian society with very small input from 
minority communities. Serbs mainly boycott the institutions of self-declared independent 
Kosovo, trying to find protection in a few remaining offshoots of Serbian government still 
operating in Kosovo. Other minority communities face no other choice but to be 
assimilated; they are forced to abandon their language, customs and identity. 
The major issue of Kosovo’s future regarding minority communities is how the 
results created by massive violations of human rights will be reversed. This primarily refers 
to return of refugees and de-enclavisation of minority areas. The goal of the international 
community to create a multiethnic society will end up as an utter failure if all those who 
were forced out of Kosovo never come back and if those who stayed continue to live in 
reservation-like, hermetically closed communities. If this is to be avoided, the question is 
how to integrate minorities into overwhelmingly Albanian dominated society and is that 
possible without having them to lose their unique ethnic, religious and linguistic 
characteristics. The constant reduction of international presence in Kosovo will eventually 
lead to a situation where at one point the provisional authorities, either as institutions of a 
fully recognized sovereign state or in some other form, will take full responsibility for all 
aspects of the social sphere, including those of minorities’. However, before that happens it 
is necessary to make these institutions functional and efficient, enabling them to address all 
the issues pertaining to minorities that have not been addressed accordingly for the past 12 
years. 
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